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INTRODUCTION

Appellant, Benjamin David Rettig (Rettig), hereby presents this replacement brief in
response to this C.Ourt's 26 Februaiy2016 Order seeking re-briefing of this matter.
JURISDICTION

Rettig appeals from a conviction and sentence for aggravated murder and aggravated
kidnapping, first degree felonies. 1his C.Ourt has appellate jurisdiction over convictions for
such crimes. Utah C.Ode § 78A-3-102(3)(~.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Issue 1:

Whether Utah C.Ode § 77-13-6(2) unconstitutionally bars Rettig from appealing his
conviction.
In part, this issue includes the below-listed questions propounded by this C.Ourt in its
26 Februaiy2016 Order.
1.

Does the "right to appeal in all cases" under article 1 § 12 of the Utah

C.Onstitution, as originally understood at the time of the framing and as properly interpreted
today, render the plea withdrawal statute, Utah C.Ode § 77-13-6(c) unconstitutional? Of
particular relevance to this question, among other things, are the following subsidiary issues:
a.

Does the right to appeal under article 1 §12 require that a waiver of

that right given as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel be subject to challenge
in an appellate proceeding in which the defendant retains the constitutional right to
counsel?
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b.

Is the right to appeal under article 1 § 12 satisfied by a challenge under

the Post C.Onviction Remedies Act, in which there is no right to effective assistance
of counsel?
2.

What is the impact of the legislature's power to regulate jurisdiction of the

courts under article 8 §§ 3 and 5 on the constitutionality of the plea withdrawal statute under
article 1 § 12?
3.

Has this C.Ourt previously resolved the foregoing questions as a matter of stare

decisis?

4.

If Mr. Rettig establishes that his constitutional right to appeal was denied by

the plea withdrawal statute, and that his right to effective assistance of counsel was denied,
what is the appropriate procedural remedy?
Standard of Review. "C.Onstitutional issues .. . are questions of law that [Utah's
appellate courts] review for correctness." Chen v. Stewart, 2004 Uf 82,125, 100 PJd 1177.
"Whether appellate jurisdiction exists js a question of law [this C.Ourt reviews] for
correctness, giving no deference to the decision below." Pledger v. Gillespie, 1999Uf54,116,
982 P.2d 572.
Preservation. This issue was not raised below, but "[t]he general rule that
constitutional issues not raised at trial cannot be raised on appeal is excepted to when a
person's liberty is at stake." State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440, 443 (Utah 1983). Alternatively,
the issue is not subject to the preservation rule given the fact that it pertains to the question
of appellate jurisdiction, which is not properly addressed by the district court or,
alternatively, the exceptional circumstances exception to the preservation rule should apply
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to warrant appellate review of this issue. "[1]he exceptional circumstances exception is illdefined and applies primarilyto rare procedural anomalies." State v. Holgate, 200UT74,112,
10 P Jd 346. 1his issue cannot be adequately addressed in any forum absent the exceptional

circumstances doctrine. It cannot properly be preserved below because the issue is an
appellate jurisdictional question, or a question that a trial court need never answer to fulfill
its proper functions. If the questions implicated by this issue are not decided in Rettig's
favor, the Utah right to appeal in all cases and the federal Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel will remain rights without an effective remedy in Utah.
. Issue 2:

Whether Rettig's defense counsel was ineffective in either or both of the following
lilStances:
First, when counsel instructed Rettig to enter a guilty plea to aggravated murder on
an accomplice liability theory, where counsel had not adequately informed Rettig of the
applicable law, where counsel had not provided Rettig with requested discovery materials
before Rettig pled guilty, where counsel did not abide by Rettig's decision on the plea offer,
and where counsel instructed Rettig to mislead the district court during plea entry.
Second, when counsel instructed Rettig to withdraw his Motion to Withdraw Guilty
Plea before the district court ruled on the motion, where the motion was based on Rettig's
argument that his prior counsel was ineffective at the time he entered his plea.
Standard of Review. An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first
time on appeal presents a question of law. State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, 16, 89 PJd 162.

3

Preservation. 1his issue was not specifically preserved below. But, ineffective
assistance of counsel may be reviewed for the first time on appeal See id.
Issue 3:

Whether the district court erred when it accepted Rettig's guilty plea to aggravated
murder where the supporting factual basis did not show that Rettig intended to help Bond

kill Mortensen.
1.

Standard of Review. "[W]hether the trial court strictly complied with

constitutional and procedural requirements for entry of a guilty plea is a question of law that
is reviewed for correctness." State v. Holland, 921 P.2d 430,433 {Utah 1996). The sufficiency
of the factual basis of a plea is reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. State v. Beckstead,
2006 UT 42, 1 13, 140 PJd 1288.

2.

Preservation. This issue was not raised below, but "[t]he general rule that

constitutional issues not raised at trial cannot be raised on appeal is excepted to when a
person's liberty is at stake." State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440,443 (Utah 1983). Alternatively,
Rettig requests plain error review. See State v. Candland, 2013 UT 55,122,309 P.3d 230.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS & STATUTES

The following provisions are set forth verbatim in the addendum to this brief:
U.S. Omst. Amend. VI.

Utah Const. Art. I § 12.
Utah Const. Art. VIII §§ 3-5.
Utah Code§ 77-13-6.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case

Rettig appeals from a final judgment of conviction and sentence for aggravated
murder and aggravated kidnapping.
Rettig challenges the constitutionality of Utah C.ode § 77-13-6(2) (c), which bars any
challenge to a guilty plea not made prior to sentencing. Challenging his guilty plea, Rettig
asserts he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that the district court erred by
accepting as sufficient the factual basis supporting his guilty plea.
II.

Proceedings & Disposition

In December 2010, the State charged Rettig with aggravated murder, a capital
offense, and a number of felonies. Rettig signed a Statement of Defendant in Support of
Guilty Plea in June 2011. R62-55. The State amended its information, and charged Rettig
with one count each of aggravated murder and aggravated kidnapping, first degree felonies.
R54-53. On June 2, 2011, Rettig entered guilty pleas to those crimes. R410.
On July 15, 2011, Rettig filed an ex parte letter with the district court, asking the
court for leave to withdraw his guilty pleas. Rl 15-14. Rettig's original counsel was replaced.
R132-31. In December 2011, replacement counsel withdrew Rettig's motion to withdraw his
pleas. R142.
Thereafter, the district court gave Rettig concurrent sentences: an indeterminate term
of 25 years to life on the aggravated murder charge and an indeterminate term of 15 years to
life on the aggravated kidnapping charge. R192-91,411:30. The district court recommended a
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fine of $10,000 on each count and restitution of $10,671.71 jointly and severallywith the codefendant. Jd. The district court recommended the privilege of parole for Rettig. Id.
InJanuaiy2012, Rettig's replacement counsel withdrew. R198-96. Thereafter, on
January 17, 2012, replacement counsel filed a Notice of Appeal via fax. R200-199. The
original was filed on January 19, 2012. R202-01. Rettig's first appeal failed for untimeliness.
R224-22.
Rettig filed a prose Motion to Reinstate Appeal Rights on April 11, 2013. R247-31.
Ultimately, on October 28, 2013, the district court granted the motion. R396-90. Rettig
timely filed his new Notice of Appeal, for this appeal, on October 30, 2013. R402-400.
In this C.Ourt, Rettig filed a Rule 23B Motion on February 26, 2014. He filed his
opening brief on May 5, 2014. The State filed its brief and opposition to Rettig's Rule 23B
motion on July 29, 2014. Rettig filed his reply brief on September 3, 2014. Subsequently, on
February 26, 2016, this C.Ourt entered an order requesting that the parties re-brief the case
and address specific questions .in addition to any other issues raised.
III.

Statement of Relevant Facts

Facts Appearing on the Record
In November 2009, Kay Mortensen was found dead in his home with multiple throat
lacerations. R2. In June 2011, Rettig entered pleas of guiltyto aggravated murder and
aggravated kidnapping. R410. The Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea (the
Statement) reads 1 as follows:

1 The

State's attorney set forth the Statement orallyto the district court, albeit not strictly
verbatim. R410:29-31.
6

On or about November 16, 2009, Martin Bond ("Bond") and I traveled in
Bond's vehicle from Vernal, Utah to Kay Mortensen's ("Mortensen") home in
Spanish Fork, Utah. The pmpose in traveling to Mortensen's home was ~o
steal firearms located in Mortensen's home. Upon arriving at Mortensen's
home, Bond indicated he would initially enter the home and then I was to
follow him and also enter the home. Bond and I entered the home without
being invited and we had a handgun with us. Bond placed zip ties on
Mortensen and both of us were wearing ski masks and latex gloves in order to
hide our identities. We commanded Mortensen to show us where his firearms
were located. Monensen took us to a bunker located behind his home and we
observed several weapons. We took Mortensen from the bunker and back into
his home. After re-entering the home, we took Monensen upstairs to a
bathroom. Bond told Mortensen to kneel down in front of the bathtub with
his back to us. While Monensen was kneeling down, I was holding Monensen
at gunpoint with Bond's handgun. Bond withdrew a knife from his person and
then placed the knife back in his pocket. At this point, Bond left the
bathroom, went downstairs and returned with a black-handled knife
approximately 10 to 12 inches in length. Upon returning, I observed Bond
take the knife and slice Mortensen's throat. I am not cenain how many times
Bond cut Mortensen's throat. After cutting his throat, I observed Bond stab
Mortensen in the base of his neck with the same knife.

Shortly after Bond cut and stabbed Mortensen, we heard someone knock on
the front door. I ran downstairs and hid behind the front door and Bond
opened the door. A female and male were at the door asking for Mortensen. (I
later discovered that the individuals were Pamela and Roger Mortensen.) I was
still holding the handgun when Pamela and Roger entered the home. I
informed Pamela and Roger that Mortensen was upstairs and that he was
okay. We told them to walk into the sunken living room and we placed zip ties
on Pamela's and Roger's hands and feet. At some point, Bond came out of the
kitchen with another knife which I believed he was going to use to kill Pamela
and Roger. I stepped in front of Bond and told him not kill Pamela and Roger.
While Pamela and Roger were tied up in the living room, I remained in the
living room with them holding the handgun while Bond removed
approximately 25 of Mortensen's weapons (including handguns and rifles)
from the bunker and placed them in Bond's vehicle. We also took ammunition
from the bunker. After placing the guns and ammunition in Bond's vehicle,
we took Roger's driver's license and told him and Pamela that they needed to
tell the police that three black men had tied them up and if they told the police
a different story, we knew where they lived and we would come back and kill
them. We left Mortensen's residence and drove back to Vernal. On our way
back to Vernal, we stopped at a rest stop and discarded our gloves in a
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dumpster. In Vernal, Bond and I went up a canyon and buried the weapons.
Following this, Bond took my hoodie and shoes in order to dispose of them.
R60-59.
Rettig admitted to having a firearm and being present while Bond committed the
murder. R410:29-31. Preparing for sentence, Rettig wrote that he participated because he
feared for his own life and had been threatened by Bond. Rl 47-46.
With intent to withdraw his guilty plea and replace his counsel, Rettig filed a letter
with the district court. RllS-13. Rettig complained his attorneys had not asked him for a
complete version of the events, had not provided him discovery prior to his plea despite
multiple requests, had not received information Rettig gave the attorneys' investigator, and
ignored Rettig's protests to the Statement. Rl 15. Rettig further claimed he had felt pressured
to admit a false version of events. R114.
Rettig's replacement counsel withdrew Rettig's request to withdraw the guilty plea,
explaining that Rettig was really looking for information and that he had resolved the issues.
See R411:24-25.

Various persons testified at the sentencing hearing on behalf of both Rettig and
Mortensen, and others submitted letters on Rettig's behalf. See general!J R411, R179-48. The
prosecution recommended that the sentences run concurrently as part of the plea agreement.
R411:20. The plea was offered in part bythe prosecution because "Mr. Rettig did agree to
assist us in the prosecution of Mr. Bond... We also- we felt very strongly all along that Mr.
Bond was actuallythe one who, who actually committed the murder." R411:21. The district
court aclmowledged that once Rettig's involvement was discovered "[he] did show complete
cooperation" and that Rettig was "taking the responsibility that [he] failed to take two years
8

ago." R411:29-30. As noted supra, the district court sentenced Rettig to serve time in prison.
R411:30.
Facts to be Developed on Remand Under Rule 23B
Rettig filed with this Court a Rule 23B Motion for Remand on February 26, 2014,
supported by affidavit, alleging facts which do not yet appear on the record and will be
developed at remand if granted. Decision on the Motion for Remand has been deferred. The
following facts, not yet appearing on the record, are necessaryto Appellant's argument.
During the plea negotiation phase, Rettig was represented by three attorneys: Michael
Esplin as lead attorney, with Stephen Frazier and Anne Boyle as assisting attorneys. Esplin,
Frazier, and Boyle never explained to Rettig Utah's laws regarding accomplice liability or the
element the State would need to prove to convict on an accomplice theory at trial.
When meeting with his attorneys, Rettig met primarily with Frazier and Boyle, with
about fifteen total visits between the two of them. Rettig met with Esplin about five times.
Most visits were under 30 minutes in duration. Rettig asked all three of his attorneys multiple
times during visits for a copy of the discovery that they had received from the State. Rettig
was not provided any discovery from his attorneys until after his guilty pleas had been

entered.
During Rettig's third meeting with Esplin, Esplin presented to Rettig an offer
..J

received from the State, which was a recommended sentence of Life without the possibility
of parole if Rettig would plead guilty to the Aggravated Murder charge. Esplin infonned
Rettig that was a "bad deal" and that he was confident he would be able to get Rettig a
sentence of seven to ten years instead. Rettig asked if a change in venue would help the case.
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Esplin said that a change in venue would be fruitless because any venue in Utah would be
biased against him. Esplin told Rettig that Rettig would have to serve time in prison. Esplin
told Rettig that Rettig was guilty because Rettig was present when Bond killed Mortensen.
During a subsequent meeting with Frazier, Rettig was told again that the attorneys were
pushing for a seven- to ten-year deal, and reiterated that they believed Rettig was guilty
because Rettig was present.
During Rettig's fourth meeting with Esplin, Esplin presented a new offer from the
State, which was an agreed sentencing recommendation of 25 years to Life. Esplin seemed
happy with the offer. Rettig rejected the offer. Esplin told Rettig that he would speak with
the prosecution about the offer, but that Rettig should not be firm to decline the offer.
Rettig noticed a change in his attorneys' attitudes toward him and his case after the 25-toLife offer was made. His attorneys told him that it was the best deal he was going to get.
Rettig's familywas called to a meeting with Rettig's attorneys. During that meeting,
the attorneys disclosed confidential information regarding Rettig's case to Rettig's family,
without Rettig's authorization. Rettig's attorneys asked Rettig's familyto convince Rettig to
accept the 25-to-Life offer.
Rettig decided to plead guilty because his attorneys told him he was guilty and that
the 25-to-Life offer was the best deal he was going to get. Rettig felt pressured by his
attorneys and his family to accept the offer.
Rettig's attorneys met with Rettig to discuss the plea deal and the charges to which
Rettig would be pleading. They showed Rettig a copy of the factual statement that would be
the basis of Rettig's plea. Rettig told his attorneys that the factual statement was untrue and
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~

that he wanted to re-write it. Rettig's attorneys said Rettig could re-write the statement.
~

Rettig's attorneys met with Rettig about one week prior to his entry of the plea. Rettig gave

his attorneys the rewritten factual statement. Rettig's attorneys said theywould take the
statement to the prosecution to discuss and negotiate the content of the factual statement.
Esplin and Frazier met with Rettig in the holding cell of the courthouse on the date
of his entry of plea. They showed Rettig the plea statement. The factual statement had not
been changed. Rettig asked his attorneys whythe statement had not been changed. Rettig's
attorneys told him that the statement had not been discussed or negotiated with the
prosecution. Theytold Rettig that the content of the statement does not matter. Theytold
Rettig that because he was present when Bond killed Mortensen, he was guilty. Rettig
expressed concern over the requirement in the plea agreement that Rettig testify against
Bond. Rettig's attorneys told Rettig not to wony, that Rettig would not be asked to testify,
and that "it's all just legal jargon anyways." Lastly Rettig's attorneys told Rettig that if the
judge asks him a question about whether everything had been explained to him, whether he
was satisfied with his attorneys, and whether he understood what was going on, that he
should say, "Yes."
After the court proceeding, Rettig had regrets about entering his plea after being
pressured and coerced to lie to Judge Low. Rettig informed his counsel that he wanted to
withdraw his plea. The next day, Frazier and Esplin met with Rettig. Rettig expressed his
concerns regarding the plea process and the pressure to lie to the court. Esplin told Rettig
that if he withdrew his plea, he would be given the death penalty. Rettig said he was not
concerned with that and wanted to take his chances. Esplin then said that the death penalty
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would not be given, but Life without parole would. Esplin was yelling at Rettig. Frazier sat
quietly during the meeting. Rettig told them again that he wanted to withdraw his plea and
that he wanted his discovery. Rettig then terminated the visit.
A few days later, Boyle met with Rettig and gave him the discovery. Boyle told Rettig
to write a letter to Judge Low if he wanted to withdraw his plea. Rettig wrote the letter to
Judge Low asking to withdraw his plea, which appears at R115-14. At the next court hearing,
~

Esplin and Frazier asked to withdraw.
Aaron Dodd was appointed as Rettig's new counsel to handle the motion to
withdraw his plea. Rettig met with Dodd about three times. Rettig informed Dodd about the
allegations in the case. In Dodd's opinion, Rettig was not guilty of aggravated murder. Dodd
told Rettig that he could get Rettig's plea withdrawn. At the next court hearing, Rettig was
surprised to learn that Aaron Dodd was no longer his attorney, and that he would now be
represented by Dana Facemyer.
About a month later, Facemyer visited with Rettig twice in custody. Facemyer said
that he felt Rettig was guilty. Facemyer did not explain Utah's accomplice liability laws to
Rettig. Facemyer said that if Rettig took the case to trial he would get the death penalty or
life with parole. Rettig does not remember ever agreeing to not attempt to withdraw his plea.
Rettig was emotionally distraught and confused during this process. No attorney adequately
explained accomplice liability and other important issues to him.

If Rettig had been properly advised regarding the law and his concerns with the plea
agreement, and had Rettig been provided with the discovery that he had requested from his
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attorneys, he would have chosen to reject the State's offer and would have exercised his right
~

to a fair trial.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Issue 1:
Utah C.Ode § 77-13-6(2) unconstitutionally bars Rettig's challenges to his guiltyplea
on appeal.
The statute unconstitutionally blocks Rettig's ineffective assistance of counsel claims
on appeal because the statute bars not only untimely challenges that otherwise comply with
the statute, but also challenges that the plea is illegitimate under the Sixth Amendment. The
Sixth Amendment provides a right to effective assistance of counsel, regardless of the plea
withdrawal statute's existence or terms. This C.Ourt was presented this issue in "Rhinehart, but
did not sufficiently address it. This C.Ourt should examine the issue more closely, particularly
in light of U.S. Supreme C.Ourt opinions in Frye, Lafler, and Padilla. Those cases are examples
of either ineffective assistance of counsel going beyond the !mowing or voluntary- standard
Utah has focused on previously or of a federal court invalidating a guilty plea based on the
Sixth Amendment.
The statute also violates Utah's right to appeal, which exists in conjunction with the
Utah constitutional right to open courts, due process, etc. Weaver declares that Utah's
constitution grants an unqualified right of appeal. Rights demand enforcement through
sufficient process, and state courts should enforce rights secured bythe U.S. C.Onstitution.
The plea withdrawal statute blocks Rettig's ability to assert his constitutional rights and other
rights related to his plea not dependent on the legislature granting a right to withdraw pleas.
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Cockerham unequivocally declares that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at

plea bargaining should not be barred bythe plea bargain agreement itself. Moreover, Rettig's
waiver should be construed as an acknowledgment that a guilty plea inherently cuts off
certain appeal arguments.
The PCRA is not a substitute for direct appellate review. Moreover, it is conceivable
that if the PCRA is held to be a sufficient substitute, a defendant might never be represented
by effective counsel either in the original or collateral proceedings.
As to article VIII of the Utah C.Onstitution, the legislature mayspecifythe court of

original jurisdiction and the court of appellate jurisdiction and also make provision for
moving between the courts of original and appellate jurisdiction. However, as Article VIII
emphasizes, there is an appeal in all cases not originating in the Utah Supreme C.Ourt. As per
Johnson, appellate jurisdiction is to review a lower court's decision or judgment and reverse,

modify, remand, etc. If Rettig's federal constitutional rights related to his guilty plea were
violated in the district court, this C.Ourt has jurisdiction to strike or vacate the guilty plea.
Further this C.Ourt is given constitutional authority to promulgate rules. The legislature is
given authorityto amend rules. The legislature has inappropriately promulgated a rule as to
when defendants may move to withdraw guilty pleas.

1his C.Ourt has not resolved whether the plea withdrawal statute violates the right to
appeal. Rhinehart claims that Merrill resolved the issue, but the "right to appeal" is mentioned
nowhere in Merrill. A resolution of one or many constitutional challenges, as in Merrill, does
not resolve all possible constitutional challenges.
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The appropriate remedy here is to vacate or strike the· guilty plea as illegitimate
because it violated constitutional rights or was based on an insufficient factual basis.
Alternatively, Rettig's motion to withdraw his plea should be reinstated.
Issue 2:
Rettig's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was violated in
numerous respects, and his guilty plea should be stricken or vacated. (These arguments are
based on facts Rettig intends to develop on Rule 23B remand. Rettig's 23B motion is
pending.)
C.Ounsel failed to adequately discuss the law of accomplice liability with Rettig, stating
to Rettig that his mere presence at Mortensen's murder made him guilty. Mere presence at a
crime does not automatically make a person guilty.
C.Ounsel failed to fulfill the obligation of providing Rettig with the discovery
information shared by the prosecution. Rettig was unable to evaluate his own case.
Despite Rettig infonning counsel he intended to plead guilty, counsel pressured
Rettig to plead guilty and unethically disclosed confidential infonnation about the case to
Rettig's family so that they could pressure him to plead guilty. C.Ounsel should have
supported Rettig's decisions and should not have disclosed confidential information.
C.Ounsel instructed Rettig to admit to a factual statement Rettig had disputed and
asked counsel to have altered, to promise to testify against Bond despite having no such
intention, and to mislead the district court in the plea colloquy.
Absent the foregoing deficiencies, Rettig would have likely insisted on trial. The
deficiencies can be considered on a cumulative basis. Rettig need only show a reasonable
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probability that but for counsel's errors, the result would have been different. Indeed, Rettig
attempted to withdraw the plea. The cumulative effect of the errors is to undennine
confidence in the correctness of the outcome.
As noted, Rettig attempted to withdraw his plea, but replacement counsel withdrew

the motion. Rettig asserts that this, too, was ineffective assistance of counsel. Although
Rettig contends this C.ourt should strike or vacate his plea as violating the U.S. Constitution,
Rettig likelycould have prevailed on a motion to withdraw the plea pursuant to Utah's plea
withdrawal statute. Many aspects of the previously mentioned claims to ineffective assistance
of counsel relate to whether Rettig's plea was knowing and voluntary. There is a reasonable
likelihood the motion would have been granted.
Issue 3:
The district court erred by accepting Rettig's guilty plea because it was based on an
insufficient factual basis.
Utah R Crim. P. 11(e)(4)(B) requires a guilty plea to be accompanied bya sufficient
factual basis. Admittedly, Rule 11 is procedural, and for violation of it to be harmful, it must
affect substantive rights. Alexander suggests that the only substantive right at issue in Rule 11
is the right for a guilty plea to be knowing and voluntary. But, Alexander itself acknowledges
that pleas must also be intelligent, as explained more completely in Breckenridge and also as
explained in the advisorycommittee notes to the federal version of Rule 11, with which Utah
intended Rule 11 to comport. The requirement of a sufficient factual basis relates to the right
for the plea to be intelligent. Breckenridge acknowledges pleas can be knowing, voluntary, and
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unintelligent. Moreover, it should be noted that the right to effective assistance of counsel
stands regardless of whether there is a statutory- right to withdraw a plea.
To be convicted of aggravated murder, a defendant must directly commit the offense
or solicit, request, command, encourage, or intentionally aid the intentional or knowing
death of another, including incident to acts, schemes, or course of conduct, or criminal
episode.
The question of whether the factual basis supported the guilty plea is a constitutional
issue exempted from the preservation rule. Alternatively, it is plain error. Plain error requires
a showing of obvious, hannful error. The requirement for obviousness can be dispensed
with in appropriate cases. The error is hannful if it undermines confidence in the outcome
reached below.
The factual basis supporting Rettig's guilty plea did not indicate Rettig acted with the
mental state required for conviction of aggravated murder or otherwise solicited, requested,
commanded, or encouraged Bond to kill Mortensen. The nearest allegation is that Rettig
held Mortensen at gunpoint before Bond returned with a knife and Rettig observed as Bond
killed Mortensen. There is no indication Rettig knew Bond was looking for a knife or what
Bond intended to do. Indeed, once Rettig understood Bond's intent and capability, Rettig
intervened to prevent Bond from killing anybody else. It was error to hold the factual basis
as being sufficient.
The insufficiency should have been clear to the district court. Alternatively, the
obviousness requirement should be dispensed with to do justice. Had the district court
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recognized the insufficiency of the factual basis, there is a reasonable probability it would not
have accepted the guilty plea to aggravated murder.

ARGUMENT
I.

Utah Code § 77-13-6(2) Unconstitutionally Bars Rettig's Appeal.

Rettig hereby addresses the issues suggested by the Gm.rt in its order for re-briefing
as well as others.

A

Utah C.ode § 77-13-6 unconstitutionally bars Rettig's abilit;yto assert his
federal right to effective assistance of counsel.
1.

The right to effactive assistance of counsel

Utah C.ode § 77-13-6(2) bars "[a]nychallenge to a guilty plea" not made "before
sentence is announced" and allows withdrawal only if the plea was unknowing or
involuntary-. Thus, the statute facially bars challenges not based on assertions that the guilty
plea was unknowing or involuntary-, including claims that the guilty plea was based on
ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment.
The Sixth Amendment reads, in pertinent part, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoythe right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." The right
to counsel includes the right to effective counsel. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668 (1984).
A criminal defendant has a right to effective assistance of counsel when being advised

whether to enter a plea. See Hill v. l.,ockhart, 474 U.S. 52 {1985). This Court has previously
been presented with the issue that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is independent
of a claim that a defendant is entitled to withdraw a guilty plea pursuant to Utah Code § 7713-6(2). State v. Rhinehart, 2007UT61,114, 167 P.3d 1046. However, the issue was not
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addressed directly in the C.Ourt's opinion. In this case, this C.Ourt should examine the issue
~

more closely. The plea withdrawal statute provides an avenue to vindicate certain
constitutional rights. But, constitutional rights can invalidate a guilty plea (or the overall
conviction) regardless of whether the plea withdrawal statute exists. If a defendant claims
ineffective assistance of counsel, the question is not whether he is entitled to withdraw his
plea under a state statute or whether the state allows any pleas to be withdrawn. The
question is whether the defendant's rights were violated.
In the years since Rhinehart, the right to effective counsel during plea bargaining has
been re-emphasized and even extended by the U.S. Supreme C.Ourt's decisions in Padilla v.
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (holding as ineffective assistance failure to inform defendant of

collateral risk of deportation), Missouri v. Frye, 123 S.Q. 1399 (2012), and Lafler v. Cooper, 132
S.Q. 1376 (2012).2
In Lafler, the defendant asserted that counsel ineffectively advised him to reject a plea
offer. Lafler, 132 S.Q. at 1383. Despite the state court holding the plea offer rejection
!mowing and voluntary, the Supreme C.Ourt stated that "[a]n inquiry into whether the
rejection of the plea is knowing and voluntary ... is not the correct means bywhich to
address a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 1390.3
In Frye, defense counsel did not inform the defendant of a plea offer, and the
defendant pied guilty after the offer had expired and without a new offer. Frye, 123 S.Q. at
See Frye, 132 S.Q. at 1413 (referencing "our newly created constitutional field of pleabargaining law'') (Scalia, J., dissenting).
3 This statement suggests that the !mowing and voluntary standard of Utah's plea withdrawal
statute does not account for defendants' Sixth Amendment rights and in fact blocks
assertion of those rights by barring any challenge not timely and not related to lmowledge or
voluntariness.
2
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1404. Analyzing its own opinion in Padilla, the Court stated that.it had "rejected the
argument ... that a knowing and voluntary plea supersedes errors by defense counsel." Id. at
1406. The Court then proceeded to explain that despite the abilityof plea colloquies to
provide states protection from claims that a plea was based on inadequate counsel, "Hill and
Padilla both illustrate that ... there may be instances when claims of ineffective assistance

can arise after the conviction is entered." Id. Moreover, the Court stated that in some
situations in which an effective assistance claim arises, "the prosecution has little or no
notice if something may be amiss and perhaps no capacity to intervene in any event." Id. at
1407. The Court acknowledged as logical and somewhat persuasive Missouri's arguments
that "it is unfair to subject [Missouri] to the consequences of defense counsel's
inadequacies," even when the defendant retains the rights to a fair trial or subsequent guilty
plea. Id. However, the Court emphasized, without criticism, the prevalence of plea
bargaining and insisted that "criminal defendants require effective counsel during plea
negotiations. 'Anything less ... might deny a defendant "effective representation by counsel
at the only stage when legal aid and advice would help him."'" Id. at 1407-08 (citation
omitted).
2.

Utah law unconstitutional/y hamstrings Rettigfrom pursuing a claim ofineffactive
assistance ofcounsel on appeaL

In light of the clarification provided by Padilla, Frye, and Lafler and their precedents,

this Court should reconsider its Rhinehart ruling that§ 77-13-6 is a constitutional and
jurisdictional bar to an appellant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
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Rettig asserts that he entered a guilty plea as a result of ineffective assistance of
~

counsel. But, Rhinehart cuts off Rettig's ability to assert this claim on appeal. Rhinehart justifies

this result in the following terms:
The ineffectiveness of a defendant's counsel may take many forms and res~t
in relieving a criminal defendant of an undesirable result. The ineffectiveness
of counsel that contributes to a flawed guilty plea, however, can spare a
defendant the consequences of her plea only if the defendant makes out the
same case required of eveiy defendant who seeks to withdraw a plea; that the
plea was not knowing and voluntary.
Rhinehart, 2007UT61,114. The crux of Rhinehart's reasoning, in essence, is that the only

ineffective assistance that matters in the plea context is the ineffectiveness that renders a plea
unlmowing or involuntaiy. This conclusion is flatly refuted by Padilla, Frye, and Lafler.
Ineffectiveness need not render a plea unlmowing or involuntary. In Lafler, the ineffective
assistance led to a knowing and voluntary decision to go to trial. In Frye, the defendant
knowingly and voluntarily pled guilty after a plea offer, of which counsel had not informed

him, had expired.
The practical effect of § 77-13-6(2) is to bar a defendant who pleads guilty to a crime
from vindicating his right to assistance of counsel. The statute unconstitutionally insulates
guilty plea convictions from appellate challenge. The legislature is free to determine whether
and on what terms defendants maywithdraw guilty pleas. But, the legislature's requirements
for guilty plea withdrawal should not be used to determine whether defendants may
vindicate rights, such as the right to effective assistance of counsel, that exist independent of
whether guilty plea withdrawal is permitted. Nor should the time limit to move to withdraw
a plea be permitted to bar any challenge to the plea.
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Perhaps this O:mrt has no jurisdiction to allow Rettig to withdraw his guilty plea
under Utah's guilty plea withdrawal statute, but even so, this court should order Retting's
plea stricken or vacated- if it cannot be withdrawn. If Rettig establishes that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court is obligated to recognize that Rettig's plea is
illegitimate under the U.S. Constitution, regardless of whether Utah's plea withdrawal statute
recognizes the existence of constitutional rights not connected to whether a guilty plea was
knowing or voluntary.

B.

The right to appeal in all cases under article I § 12 of the Utah C.onstitution
renders Utah's plea withdrawal statute unconstitutional.

"In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have ... the right to appeal in all cases.
Utah C.onst. Art. I § 12; see also Utah Code § 77-18a-1 (" A defendant may, as a matter of
right, appeal from: (a) a final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict or plea.").
There is little drafting history regarding the right to appeal. But, other provisions
correlate to allow appeal of Rettig's Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel claim: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law." Id. art. I § 7. Also, "[a]11 courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to

him ... shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered without ...
unnecessary delay. Id. art. I§ 11. And, "Except for matters filed originallywith the Supreme
Court, there shall be in all cases an appeal of right from the court of original jurisdiction to a
court with appellate jurisdiction over the case." Id. art. VIII, § 5
In a case decided when the Utah Constitution was young, this C.ourt declared "the
provisions of our state C.onstitution ... gave the petitioners here an unqualijied right of appeal
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.
~

regardless of the plea entered in the city court." Weaver v. Kimball, 202 P. 9, 10 (Utah 1921)
..iJ

(emphasis

added).

Utah's plea withdrawal statute, in violation of Utah's constitution, blocks Rettig's
ability to assert his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel and any other
right afforded him by federal or state constitutions, statutes, and rules of procedure.
It is axiomatic that every right demands enforcement through sufficient process. See,
e.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 430 (1986) (O'C.Onner, J., concurring in part and

dissenting in part) ("If there is one fundamental requisite of due process, it is that an
individual is entitled to an opportunityto be heard."); Fqy v. Noisa, 372 U.S. 391, 427 (1963)
(stating that due process "comprehends not only the right to be heard but also a number of
explicit procedural rights," that "due process denied in the proceedings leading to conviction
is not restored just because the state court declines to adjudicate the claimed denial on the
merits, and that "forfeiture of remedies does not legitimize the unconstitutional conduct by
which [a defendant's] conviction was procured"); Ex Parle Young, 209 U.S. 123, 176 (1908)
("We must assume ... that the state courts will enforce every right secured by the
C.Onstitution.").
In Utah, a defendant may withdraw a guilty plea. Utah C.Ode § 77-13-6(2). As creator
of this statutory right, the legislature has set the conditions for exercise of this right, stating
that only unknowing or involuntary guilty pleas may be withdrawn. Id. Undoubtedly, those
conditions balance the interests of finality and certain constitutional rights. The problem
arises where the statute bars any challenge to a guilty plea and where courts hold that they
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cannot adjudicate any challenge related to the guilty plea that is either untimely, unrelated to
whether the plea was knowing/voluntary, or both.
The terms of the statutorily created right to withdraw a guilty plea are now being used
to determine whether courts have jurisdiction to vindicate other rights that exist
independently of state statute. If Utah had no plea withdrawal statute, criminal defendants
would still be able to complain that they were denied effective assistance of counsel or that
their guilty pleas were unknowing, involuntary, and/ or tmintelligent.4
Utah's plea withdrawal statute is barring appeals that would be valid in the absence of
the plea withdrawal statute and case law holding it to be jurisdictional. This implicates not
onlythe right to appeal, but the closely connected rights to due process and open courts.
The right to effective assistance of counsel demands enforcement through sufficient process.
State courts must enforce rights secured bythe U.S. C.Onstitution. Utah defendants are
guaranteed not only access to Utah courts to assert their rights (including federal rights) but
also that remedies should be administered without unnecessary delay.
The U.S. C.Onstitution guarantees effective assistance of counsel at the plea bargaining
stage. The U.S. C.Onstitution requires pleas to be !mowing, voluntary, and intelligent. The
Utah C.Onstitution guarantees a right to appeal. The Utah C.Onstitution guarantees due
process and open courts to assert constitutional and other rights, whether granted byfederal
or state constitutions or laws. A plea withdrawal statute should not be interpreted to bar the
exercise or vindication of constitutional rights or the vindication of independently existing
rights it did not create.

4

The federal right that guilty pleas need be intelligent is discussed in Part III, infra.
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Even if Rettig does not qualify for withdrawal of his plea under the withdrawal
statute, he is entitled to argue that the ultimate conviction was unconstitutional. This Court
should consider the merits of Rettig's claims. On the merits, Rettig's guilty plea should be
stricken or vacated, even if not "withdrawn" in accordance with the plea withdrawal statute.

1.

Does the right to appeal under article 1 § 12 require that a waiver ofthat right
given as a result ofineffactive assistance of counsel be subject to challenge in an
appellate proceeding in which the defendant retains the constitutional right to
counsel?

Yes.
[A] claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the
negotiation of a plea agreement cannot be barred by the agreement itself. It is
altogether inconceivable to hold such a waiver enforceable when it would
deprive a defendant of the opportunity to assert his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel where he had accepted the waiver in reliance on delinquent
representation.
United States v. Cockerham, 237 FJd 1179, 1184 (10th Gr. 2001) (internal quotations omitted)

(holding that a waiver of a right to collaterally attack a guilty plea cannot be effective where
the collateral attack is based on ineffective assistance of counsel at the plea negotiation
phase).

If the waiver is given as a result of ineffective assistance of counseL5 it is invalid
under the federal constitution, and both the state and federal constitutions require that the
defendant be given due process to request a remedy.
Rettig signed the Statement in support of his guilty pleas. R62-55. The Statement
indicated, "[b]y pleading guilty, I understand my right to appeal is limited. I understand that I
5 There

..J

~

is an inherent problem with an attorney advising a client not onlyto plead guilty, but
additional!J to waive some of the appeal rights that have not been obliterated by the logical
implications of a guilty plea. Moreover, advising a client to waive an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim for appeal would pose a conflict for the potentially ineffective counsel.
25

am giving up my right to appeal my conviction if I plead guilty. I understand that if I wish to
appeal my sentence, I must file a notice of appeal within 30 days after my sentence is
entered." R58. The next paragraph stated, "I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I
am waiving and giving up all the statutory and constitutional.rights explained above." Id.
Rettig's signed statement regarding his appellate rights should be interpreted as
reflecting an understanding that under Utah law, appeal options are limited after a guilty plea
has been entered, rather than a voluntary waiver of Rettig's constitutional appeal rights after
entry of a guilty plea. Even if the signed statement is an explicit waiver of appeal rights, it
cannot be effective against an appeal based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at
the plea bargaining phase.
2.

Is the right to appeal under article I§ 12 satisfied by a challenge under the Post
Conviction Remedies Act, in which there is no right to effettt"ve assistance of counsel?

"A petition for post-conviction relief, or habeas corpus, collaterally attacks a

conviction and/ or a sentence. It is not a substitute for direct appellate review." Gardner v.
Holden, 888 P.2d 608, 613 (Utah 1994). It is a civil, district court procedure where an indigent

defendant generally begins the process unrepresented and has no right to counsel. Utah
Cbde § 78B-9-109.
Moreover, the right to appeal is tied to vindication of other rights, such as the Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. If a defendant is denied ineffective
assistance of counsel at the plea bargaining stage and barred from asserting as much on
direct appeal, he must resort to the PCRA, which guarantees no counsel. Ultimately, under a
system that forces defendants to claim ineffective assistance of counsel under the PCRA, a
defendant denied effective assistance of counsel might never receive or vindicate his right to
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effective assistance of counsel. As discussed supra, even a defendant entering a guiltyplea is
guaranteed the right of effective assistance of counsel.
C

The legislature's power to regulate jurisdiction of the courts under article VIII
§§ 3 and 5 does not legitimize the plea withdrawal statute's attempt to block
any challenge to a guilty plea, and the plea withdrawal statute's deadline to
bring a motion to withdraw a plea infringes on this C.Ourt's power under
article VIII§ 4.

Section 3 of article VIII grants this C.Ourt appellate jurisdiction. Section 5 of article
VIII unambiguously states that there is an appeal of right in all cases from a "court of

original jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction". "Except for matters filed
originally with the Supreme C.Ourt, there shall be in all cases an appeal of right from the
court of original jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction over the case." Utah C.Onst.
art. VIII,§ 5. "The Supreme C.Ourt shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence to be used in
·...i)

the courts of the state ... " Id. art. VIII,§ 4. With a two-thirds vote, the "Legislature may
amend the Rules of Procedure." Id. (emphasis added). 6

"Appellate jurisdiction is the jurisdiction to review the decision or judgment of an
inferior tribunal, upon the record made in that tribunal, and to affirm, reverse or modify
such decision; judgment, or decree." State v. Johnson, 114 P.2d 1034, 1037 (Utah 1941).
"There being no constitutional inhibitions, the legislature may define and prescribe the
forum in which actions may or must be commenced, and the procedure necessary-to pass
._;

from one court to another. Id. at 1039 (performing analysis on the question of whether a
prosecution should have been initiated in district or city court).

6

The plea withdrawal statute passed with two-thirds vote.
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The plea withdrawal statute blocks "any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the
time period specified" and further provides that only unlmowing and involuntary guilty pleas
may be withdrawn. Utah C.Ode § 77-13-6(2). Under this statute, a defendant cannot assert on
appeal that his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was violated. Stale v.
Rhinehart, 2007UT61,114, 167 P.3d 1046.

As explained in Johnson, a court with appellate jurisdiction is to review the decision or
judgment of the lower tribunal and affirm, reverse, modify, etc. This means that all litigants
are entitled to have a higher court review the decision of a lower court and to have the
higher court fix mistakes made by the lower court. As further explained in Johnson, the
legislature's role is to specify the court of original jurisdiction (within constitutional bounds)
and provide rules for how to get from the court of original jurisdiction to the court of
appellate jurisdiction. The legislature should not be able to specifywhat portions of the
proceedings below may be reviewed. The right of appeal is unqualified. Weaver v. Kimball, 202
P. 9, 10 (Utah 1921)
Thus, the legislature is not entitled to bar any challenge to a guilty plea as it has
attempted to do in the plea withdrawal statute. A defendant is entitled to appeal and have a
higher court review the decision. If the appellant asserts that he should be allowed to
withdraw his plea, the appellate court should review whether the statutorily-created right to
withdraw a plea may be invoked or whether it is too late to withdraw or whether the district
court erred in refusing leave to withdraw. If the appellant asserts his plea violated rights
granted by the federal constitution, the appellate court should review whether that is true
and strike the plea as unconstitutional if the court finds a violation.
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Section 4, article VIII, grants this C.ourt authorityto adopt the rules of procedure to
be used in this state. For example, U.RC.P. 59 sets the deadline to move for a new trial in
certain cases. Utah's plea withdrawal statute specifies that a motion to withdraw a plea must
be made before sentence is announced. Tlus is a deadline similar to other procedural
deadlines. However, it has been promulgated by the legislature instead of this C.ourt. The
legislature has exceeded its bounds. The legislature mayonlyamend rules. Here, it has
promulgated a rule.
Sections 3-5 of article VIII of the Utah C.Onstitution do not justifythe legislature's
use of the plea withdrawal statute to block the ability of this C.ourt to review whether the
lower court honored a defendant's rights, whether they be statutory or constitutional.
D.

This C.Ourt has not resolved the foregoing questions as a matter of stare
decisis.

As an initial matter, it should be noted that a court may depart from precedent if it
was erroneous or conditions have changed. State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393,399 (Utah 1994).

Presumably, changing conditions include U.S. Supreme C.Ourt opinions cutting against a state
court's precedents.7
A nwnber of Utah cases address various versions of the plea withdrawal statute. But
as to analysis of whether the current version violates the right to appeal or is justified by the
legislature's regulatory power, case law is sparse.
In State v. Menill, 2005 UT 34, 1121-47, 114 P.3d 585, this C.Ourt addressed a nwnber
of constitutional challenges to "imposition of" a "finite period to bring a motion to
To the extent any precedent blocks the relief sought herein, Rettig requests that this C.ourt
overrule that precedent as erroneous from the beginning or now operating under new
federal case law.
7

29

withdraw a guilty plea." This C.ourt ruled that the plea withdrawal statute does not violate
constitutional provisions regarding open courts, separation of powers, due process, equal
protection, or uniform application of laws. Id. This C.ourt did not directly address the right to
appeal or grapple with whether a state plea withdrawal statute can affect a Sixth Amendment
challenge to the legitimacy of a conviction.
In State v. Rhinehart, 2007UT61,111, 167 P.3d 1046, the defendant asserted that she
was unconstitutionally deprived of her right to appeal. In response, this C.ourt invoked
Merrill, stating that the statute was "constitutional." Id. 112. However, the phrase "right to

appeal" is found nowhere in the Mem·ll opinion. The Rhinehart defendant raised the right to
appeal, but this C.ourt did not meaningfully address the assertion thereof.

E.

If Mr. Rettig prevails on his ar_guments regarding the constitutionality of the
plea withdrawal statute, ineffective assistance of counsel, etc.• this C.Ourt
should vacate the guilty plea as inappropriately entered or accepted.

In Lafler, the U.S. Supreme C.ourt required that the defendant be placed in the same
procedural position he had occupied before his rights were infringed upon. Lafler v. Cooper,
132 S.Q. 1376, 1391 (2012). The C.Ourt went so far as to order that Michigan re-offer the
plea bargain to the defendant, acknowledging that whether doing so affected the convictions
and sentence depended on the trial court's exercise of its legal discretion with regard to plea
bargains. Id.
Rettig's conviction is illegitimate because his guilty plea is based upon ineffective
assistance of counsel and was entered in violation of the constitutional requirement that
guilty pleas be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. The plea withdrawal statute blocks his
ability to vindicate his rights in either direct violation of the constitutional rights themselves
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or in violation of Utah's right to appeal, which is designed to provide a method to assert
those rights, and others.

1his C.ourt should allow Rettig to develop the record below on his ineffective
assistance claim and strike or vacate the guilty plea if ineffective assistance is established.

This would place Rettig in the position in which he stood before he entered an
unconstitutional guilty plea. Alternatively, this C.ourt should reinstate Rettig's original motion
to withdraw his guilty plea, which was withdrawn by replacement counsel, and allow Rettig
to proceed forward based on the granting or denial of that motion. As a second alternative,

this C.ourt should acknowledge that the guilty plea was based on an insufficient factual basis
and strike the guilty plea and allow Rettig to proceed forward from there.
II.

Rettig received ineffective assistance of counsel at the plea bargaining stage
and when replacement counsel withdrew Rettig's motion to withdraw his
guilty plea. 8

The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. C.onstitution states, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions,
~

the accused shall enjoythe right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."
Counsel must be effective. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970). Without
effective counsel, we cannot have faith in the reliability of the adversarial system and its
outcome. Lafferty v. State, 2007 UT 73, 111, 175 P.3d 530. To show ineffective assistance of
counsel, the appellant must demonstrate (1) that counsel's perfonnance was deficient, and

_;;

(2) that the deficiency prejudiced the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687
(1984).

The arguments in this Part are based largely on facts alleged, but not on the record. Rule
23B remand is necessaryto develop facts on the record. Rettig's 23B motion is unresolved.
8
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Performance was deficient when counsel's actions "fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." Lafferty, 2007 UT 73, 112 (internal
citations omitted). Prejudice is established by showing a reasonable probability of a different
outcome if the deficiencywere corrected. Id. at 113. Reasonable probability is not a morelikely-than-not standard, but merely a "probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome." Id. In the context of a guilty-plea conviction, it is unnecessaryto demonstrate
reasonable probability of success at trial. Prejudice is demonstrated if there is a reasonable
probabilitythat the defendant would have insisted on trial, instead of pleading guilty, absent
coW1Sel's deficiency. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
Rettig's counsel was deficient as set forth in the following subparts of this Part.
A

C.ounsel did not adequately discuss with Rettig the law of accomplice liability.

"After informing himself or herself fully on the facts and the law, defense counsel
should advise the accused with complete candor concerning all aspects of the case[.]"
American Bar Association Criminal Justice Standards Defense Function Standard 4-5.l(a);

Utah R Prof. C.ond. 1.4(6). C.ounsel must not intentionally mislead the client about the law.
See ABA Criminal Justice Standards Defense Function Standard 4-5.1(6).

C.ourts have found counsel to be deficient where counsel's advice regarding the law is
either mistaken or intentionally misstated. See, e.g., United States v. Moonry, 497 FJd 397 (4th

Cir. 2007) (holding as ineffective assistance where defendant pled guilty based on coW1Sel's
mistaken representation that there was no d~fense of justification); see also Garcia v. State, 237
PJd 716 (N.M 2010).
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<i>

This C.Ourt has found counsel ineffective where
... it is unclear from the record before us whether [counsel] carefully analyzed
the law and the facts and laid out the options for [defendant] prior to
[defendant's] initial guilty plea hearing or whether he simply encouraged
[defendant] to plead guilty to capital homicide on the basis of his own
judgment that [defendant] was guilty of capital homicide.
State v. Holland, 921 P.2d 430,436 (Utah 1996).

In this case, Rettig alleges that neither Esplin, Frazier, Boyle, nor Facemyer explained
to him Utah's law of accomplice liability under Utah C.Ode § 76-2-202. C.Ounsel told Rettig

his mere presence while Bond killed Mortensen made Rettig guilty of aggravated murder.
C.Ounsel did not lay out the law and the facts before Rettig and allow him to make a decision.
C.Ounsel encouraged Rettig to plead guilty to aggravated murder on the basis of their own
judgment that Rettig was guilty of aggravated murder.
Mere presence, does not make a person culpable of a crime committed by someone
else. To be found guilty of a crime physically committed by someone else, the State is
·,.J

required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with the same mental
state required for the offense and either solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged, or
intentionallyaided the other person to commit the offense. Utah C.Ode § 76-2-202.
Furthermore, intentionally aiding a person to commit one offense does not make a
defendant culpable for all offenses committed by that person during the same course of

.;;

events. The State must make a separate showing with respect to each crime that the
defendant had a culpable mental state with respect to, and intentionally aided in the
commission of the crime.
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Rettig being present and intentionally aiding in a robbery should not make him guilty
of a murder committed by another person during the robbery. Rettig maintained from the
beginning that he did not know that Bond was going to kill Mortensen. After Bond had
killed Mortensen, Rettig prevented the further deaths of Roger and Pamela Mortensen.
Evidence was sufficient to suggest that Rettig did not "solicit[], request[], command□,
encourage□, or intentionally aid"

Bond to kill Mortensen, as would be required for Rettig to

be found guilty of the murder of Mortensen. See Utah Code § 76-2-202.9
Counsel below should have correctly advised Rettig about what the State was
required to prove to convict Rettig of Aggravated Murder. Failing to do so falls below an
objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional nonns. See Strickland.
Rettig would not have pled guilty to aggravated murder, but would have insisted on a trial
had he been properly instructed on the law of accomplice liability.

B.

Counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to provide Rettig with
discovezy: materials from the State.

A defense attorney has an ethical duty to keep his client informed regarding the
representation, including a dutyto "promptlycomplywith reasonable requests for
information." Utah R Prof. Cond. l.4(a)(3), (4). "[I]f the client requests a full copy of the file
or certain reports or infonnation, unless otherwise restricted, it must be provided to the
client, unless exceptional circumstances apply." Utah State Bar Ethics AdvisoiyOpinion
Committee, Op. No. 06-04, December 8, 2006, 115. When making a determination whether
to accept or reject a plea offer, a defendant should be in possession of facts pertinent to such
For a further discussion on the application of the law of accomplice liability to the facts at
issue in this case, see Pan III, infra, dealing with the sufficiency of the factual basis used to
support the entry of the guilty plea to the charge of aggravated murder.
9
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a decision, including evidence the State intends to use against the Defendant should the
matter go to trial. When a client asks for a copy of any discovery, generally his attorney
cannot refuse.
In this matter, Rettig requested copies of the discovery from his attorneys several
times prior to his entry of guilty pleas. C.Opies were not forthcoming. It was only after he
told his attorneys of his intent to withdraw his pleas that a copy of his discovery was
provided to him. Rettig was not fully in possession of the facts of his case when he entered

his pleas, due to his attorneys' failure to provide the requested portions of his file. This
failure falls below the attorney's ethical obligations and objective standards of
reasonableness, and undermines our confidence that Rettig would have entered the same
plea had he been informed of the evidence against him.
C

C.Ounsel rendered ineffective assistance by pressuring Rettig to plead guilty
throu_gh the unethical involvement of Rettig's family rather than abiding
Rettig-'s decision to reject the plea offer.

An attorney is bound by his client's decision with respect to the entry of a plea. Utah

R Prof. Cond. 1.2(a); Williams v. Jones, 571 F.3d 1086 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding counsel
ineffective in pressuring defendant to reject a plea offer rather than abide by the client's
decision with respect to what plea to enter). Furthermore, an attorney owes a duty of
confidentiality to the client and must "not reveal information relating to the representation
yg

of a client unless the client gives informed consent," the disclosure is necessaryto fulfill the
client's objectives, or as otherwise pennitted by the Rules of Professional C.Onduct. Utah R
Prof. C.Ond 1.6(a).
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Rettig informed his coW1Sel that he was rejecting the State's proposed plea agreement
wherein Rettig would plead guilty to aggravated murder and aggravated kidnapping in
exchange for a 25-to-Life agreed sentence. Rettig's coW1Sel did not inform the prosecution
of Rettig's rejection, did not seek a more favorable plea agreement, and did not set the
matter for trial. Instead, counsel violated Rettig's trust and called Rettig's family into a
meeting where confidential information related to the representation was freely shared with
Rettig's family members without Rettig's consent. The purpose of the meeting was to enlist
the help of Rettig's familyto exert pressure on Rettig to accept the plea offer.
Counsel may have felt that Rettig was making a mistake in rejecting the state's offer.
The mistake was Rettig's to make. His attorney's dutywas to support Rettig's decision and, if
the matter was ultimately set for trial, give Rettig the best trial he could give him. Counsel, by
fighting Rettig's choice and recruiting Rettig's family to pressure Rettig, stripped Rettig of

this important choice. Had counsel fulfilled their proper role of advising and supporting
Rettig in his choice of plea, Rettig's rejection of the plea offer would have been
communicated to the State, and the matter would either have been set for trial or resulted in
a more favorable plea agreement.
D.

Counsel rendered ineffective assistance by instructing Rettig to admit to a
factual statement he believed to be untrue, state his agreement to a promise to
testify to which he did not agree, and mislead the court regarding whether he
understood his rights and plea, and whether he was satisfied with his
attorneys.

An attorney owes a duty of candor to the court. Utah R Prof. C.ond. 3.3. The

attorney must not offer a false statement of material fact or fail to correct a false statement
of material fact. Id. 3.3(a)(1). It is unethical for an attomeyto request or pennit his client to
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lie to the court. Id. 3.3(a)(3). C.Ounsel may be ineffective for making such misrepresentations
where it concerns the factual basis for enuyof a guilty plea. United States v. DeSimone, 736,
F.Supp.2d 477 (D.RI. 2010) (C.Ounsel was ineffective where defendant insisted the factual
statement was untrue, but counsel instructed defendant to accept the recitation, and where
counsel led defendant to understand that lying to the coutt was necessaiy to get his plea
accepted.).
In the instant matter, not only did counsel below instruct Rettig to admit to a factual
statement which Rettig told them was untrue, they did so over Rettig's request that the
Statement be changed. Furthermore, counsel instructed Rettig to accept a plea condition
(testifying against Bond) to which they lmew Rettig did not agree, and likely would not
honor, even after Rettig expressed dissatisfaction with the condition. When discussing the
written factual statement to support the proposed plea, Rettig told his attorneys that it was
untrue. Rettig could not, in good faith, tell the judge that the factual statement contained a
report of what had happened on the date of the alleged offenses. Rettig offered changes to
the factual statement so that it would reflect the truth as Rettig saw it. Rettig's counsel told

him that theywould take Rettig's offered changes and discuss them with the prosecutor.
Instead, they made no effort to have Rettig's changes incorporated into the plea statement.
When it came time for Rettig to enter his plea, the statement remained as it had been. No
~

changes were discussed with the prosecutor or incorporated. The consequence of this
inaction was that counsel offered a factual basis containing significant untruths, and the
district court accepted it. At the very least, counsel knew that Rettig did not believe the facts
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he admitted to and neither prevented Rettig from entering those admissions nor corrected
the district court's belief that Rettig was entering an honest admission. 10
The plea statement included a provision that Rettig must testify truthfully against
Bond if called to do so. In the moments immediately preceding the entiy of the plea hearing,
Rettig was looking over the plea statement and found the agreement to testify. He expressed
concern and wanted that agreement taken out. His attorneys, instead of infonning the
prosecution or the judge that Rettig would not agree to such a provision, told Rettig that
"it's all just legal jargon" and that Rettig would never be called upon to testify. C.ounsel
engaged in three-way misrepresentations: counsel misrepresented to Rettig his duties under
the plea agreement and misrepresented to the prosecutor and the judge whether Rettig
agreed to the provisions of the plea statement.
Finally, Rettig's attorneys instructed him how to respond to the district court's
colloquy with him They instructed him to answer affirmatively when asked whether he
understood his rights. They instructed him to express satisfaction with his attorneys advice
and assistance. They instructed him to saythat he did not have any questions. They
instructed him to say that he understood the plea that he was entering. They did not instruct

him to answer honestly and truthfully the questions the court would ask of him. Rettig,
following the instructions of his attorneys, went through the motions of answering the
court's colloquy, giving all the correct answers for his plea to be accepted, despite the
extreme reservations he felt and had expressed to his attorneys.

Even if the factual basis contained in the plea statement was completely true, it was
insufficient to support a conviction for aggravated murder. See Part III, infra.
10
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Had Rettig's concerns regarding the plea statement's factual basis and testimony
provision been adequately addressed or acknowledged, Rettig likely would not have pled
guilty but would have insisted upon trial. The failure of trial counsel to negotiate changes to
the plea statement was a primary-reason Rettig gave for his desire to withdraw his plea.
Rl 15. Furthermore, had counsel instructed Rettig to honestly answer the district court's
questions, Rettig would likely have expressed his concerns with the plea he was entering,
which may have resulted in the court refusing to take Rettig's guilty plea. We cannot have
confidence that the outcome would have been the same absent counsel's errors.

E.

There is a reasonable probability that absent counsel's deficiencies, Rettig
would not have pied gyilty and would have insisted on trial.

It is not necessary that any single deficiency of counsel satisfy the Strick/and prejudice
prong j£ the cumulative effect of trial counsel's deficiencies is such that we cannot have
confidence in the outcome. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 ("The defendant must show that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors [plural, all
errors considered together], the result of the proceeding would have been different."); see also
Hanis ex rel. Ramseyer v. Wood, 64 FJd 1432, 1438-39 (9th Gr. 1995) (stating, "We do not

hesitate to conclude that there is a reasonable probabilitythat, absent the deficiencies, the
outcome of the trial might well have been different," and holding that analysis of individual
prejudicial effect of each deficiency is unnecessclf}?; if. United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462,
1471 (10th Gr. 1990) ("[A] cumulative-error analysis should evaluate onlythe effect of
matters determined to be error, not the cumulative effect of non-errors.").
Rettig was severely prejudiced by the combined effect of counsel's deficient conduct.
After Rettig's plea was entered, Rettig attempted to correct what he felt was a miscarriage of
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justice by withdrawing his guilty plea and correcting the misrepresentations that had been
made to the district court. Rl 15-14. Rettig wrote as follows:
I feel as I have been inadequately represented by my current legal counsel. I
feel I was pressured into agreeing to the plea agreement set forth by the
prosecution. I also feel it was wrong of my attorneys [sic] to tell me to claim
false events in open court as fact. But more importantly, I am ashamed of
myself for doing so, knowing it was the wrong thing to do.
R114. Rettig's reasons for wanting to withdraw his plea reflect some of the same reasons his
counsel's conduct was deficient as argued herein- namely, his attorneys failed to adequately
discuss the case with Rettig, his attorneys did not provide Rettig with the State's evidence
against him, his attorneys failed to have the factual basis changed to reflect what Rettig
believed to be truth, and Rettig was pressured into accepting a plea offer he did not want to
accept. Rl 15-14.
Each of counsel's errors combines with the others to nndennine confidence in the
correctness of the outcome. Rettig's attorneys did not explain the law of accomplice liability,
that the State would be required to prove that Rettig intentionally aided, solicited, or
commanded the murder of Kay Mortensen in order to convict Rettig of aggravated murder.
Rettig's story is that he did not know Bond would kill Kay Mortensen until it was too late to
do anything about it, and that he stepped in to intervene before Bond could kill more
people. Rettig's attorneys did not tum over the portions of Rettig's file containing the State's
discovery until after the plea was entered, making it impossible for Rettig to evaluate the
strength of the State's case against him. Rettig in fact rejected the State's plea offer, though
that rejection was never communicated to the State. Instead Rettig's family was brought into
the case without Rettig's consent in order to pressure Rettig into accepting the plea offer.
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Rettig's counsel even went so far as to insist that Rettig admit as a fact a statement which
Rettig had told them was untrue, and to answer the district court's colloquy in a very specific

way, regardless of whether Rettig's answers were truthful. Had Rettig's attorneys behaved
differently, there is a reasonable probability Rettig would not have entered a guilty plea, but
would have insisted upon trial.

F.

Rettig's counsel was ineffective in withdrawing Rettig's motion to withdraw
his plea without Rettig's consent where there was evidence that the plea was
unknowing and involuntary.

The ineffectiveness alleged in this Part, supra, all have some effect on the
lmowingness and voluntariness of Rettig's plea. The plea cannot be said to be a !mowing
plea if Rettig was not properly advised of the elements the State would be required to show
in order to prove that Rettig was guilty of aggravated murder. One cannot lmow what one is
pleading to unless one understands the elements of the offense.
Rettig's plea was not a knowing plea where Rettig was not granted access to the
discovery provided by the State and contained in his counsel's file. Rettig was not fully aware
of the evidence the State had against Rettig and could not evaluate the strength of the State's
case. Rettig thus could not make an informed decision whether to accept or reject the State's
plea offer. Rettig's plea was thus not a !mowing plea.
Rettig's plea was not voluntarywhere his counsel never communicated to the State
Rettig's rejection of the plea offer, and instead enlisted the assistance of Rettig's family to
pressure Rettig into accepting the State's offer. Rettig's choice was to plead not guilty. His
attorneys refused to allow Rettig to make that choice. Rettig's plea was thus not voluntary.
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In this matter, after Rettig had filed his own written motion with the district court
attempting to withdraw his plea {R115-14), conflict counsel was appointed {R132). Instead
of pursuing Rettig,s goal of withdrawing his plea, conflict counsel withdrew Rettig,s motion.
R411:24-25. Had conflict counsel pursued the motion, one of two things would have
happened: 1) the motion would have been granted, in which case Rettig's objective of
preserving his right to a trial would have been fulfilled; or 2) the motion would have been
denied in which case Rettig would have proceeded to sentencing. There is no tactical basis
for conflict coUI_1Sel's decision to not pursue Rettig's stated objectives. There is a reasonable
likelihood that the motion to withdraw Rettig's plea would have been successful and a
different outcome would have resulted.
III.

The district court erred when it accepted Rettig's guilty plea to aggravated
murder where the factual basis of the plea did not support Rettig's conviction
for aggravated murder as party or as accomplice. 11

A

Factual Basis Required

A trial court may not accept a guilty plea unless it finds that "a factual basis [exists]

for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it establishes that the charged crime was actually
committed by the defendant ... " Utah R Crim. P. 11(e)(4)(B). The requirement of a finding
of a sufficient factual basis is a requirement of Due Process. See State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d
440, 443-44 (Utah 1983).

This C.ourt may lack jurisdiction to consider the error asserted in this Part if Utah C.ode
§ 77-13-6(2)(c) survives Rettig's constitutional challenge. This is an example of whythe
statute is unconstitutional. The statute bars all challenges to a guilty plea save those timely
11

and related to lmowledge and voluntariness. A motion to withdraw a plea based on whether

the plea was intelligent or whether the defendant received effective assistance of counsel
cannot be granted (or its denial reversed on appeal).
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Admittedly, court rules "prescribe the method bywhich individuals enforce their
rights," are ''procedural in nature, and cannot create or modify substantive rights." State v.
Alexander, 2012 UT 27,140,279 PJd 371. Further, variances from rule 11 not affecting

substantial rights are to be disregarded. Utah R Crim. P. 11 (ij. However, expounding on rule
11 (ij, this C.ourt has suggested that the substantial right implicated by rule 11 is the right of
defendants to knowingly and voluntarily make their pleas. Alexander, 143. That suggestion is
problematic. The right for a defendant's plea to be knowing and voluntary is a constitutional
right. Id. 116. The abilityto withdraw an unknowing and/ or involuntary plea is a right
granted by the Utah Legislature. See id. 141. These two rights are not identical, even if the
latter is designed to enforce the former. Presumably, even a state lacking a plea withdrawal
statute must answer as to whether the guilty plea was knowing and voluntary (and entered
with effective assistance of counse~ under the U.S. constitution.
Moreover, the constitutional right in question is the right for a guilty plea to be
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Id. 116. The requirement in rule 11(e)(4)(B) for a sufficient
factual basis is specifically designed to ensure that the guiltyplea is intelligent in addition to
being knowing and voluntary. 12 Interestingly, Utah's plea withdrawal statute does not allow a
plea to be withdrawn because it was unintelligent. Technically, the legislature may decide
By design, Rule 11 confonns to its federal counterpart, which ensures pleas were
intelligent. See Utah R Crim. P. 11 AdvisoryC.ommittee Notes (stating that "[t]he addition
of a requirement for a finding of a factual basis in section (e)(4)(B) tracks federal rule 11(f),
and is in accordance with prior case law. E.g. State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440 (Utah
1983)"); Fed. R Crim. P. 11 Notes of AdvisoryC.ommittee on Rule-1966 Amendment
(stating that the factual basis requirement "protect[s] a defendant who is in the position of
pleading voluntarily with an understanding of the nature of the charge but without realizing
that his conduct does not actually fall within the charge"); see also Breckenridge, 688 P.2d at 444
n.2 (acknowledging that instances of unintelligent, voluntary, and knowing pleas must be
guarded against, even if rare).
12
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whether to allow plea withdrawal and for what reasons, but the federal constitution imposes
requirements on pleas that cannot be circumvented. Utah's plea withdrawal statute does not
leave room for a constitutional challenge to a plea, but operates to bar any challenge to a

guilty plea that does not complywith the statute's terms, including those challenges based on
federal constitutional rights.
B.

Aggravated Murder

Pursuant to Utah C.ode § 76-2-202, a defendant may only be convicted of a crime if,
"acting with the mental state required for the commission of an offense [he] directly
commits the offense, [or] solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids
another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense[.]" To be guilty of
aggravated murder, a person must "intentionally or knowingly cause□ the death of another
under any of [an enumerated list of circumstances, including] incident to an act, scheme, or
course of conduct, or criminal episode during which the actor committed or attempted to
commit aggravated robbery, robbery, ... aggravated burglary, burglary, aggravated
kidnapping, or kidnapping[.] Utah C.ode § 76-5-202(1)(d).
C

Plain Error

The question of whether the factual basis supported the guilty plea to aggravated
murder (and thus whether Rettig's plea was intelligent) is a constitutional issue exempted
from the preservation rule because Rettig's liberty is at stake. Alternatively, Rettig requests
that the issue be reviewed on plain error. To obtain relief under the plain error doctrine, the
appellant is required to show that "(~ an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious
to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful ...." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah
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1993). "[I]n appropriate cases we can exercise our discretion to dispense with the

vu

requirement of obviousness so that justice can be done, as when an error not readily
apparent to the court or counsel proves harmful in retrospect." State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29,
35 n.8 (Utah 1989). The error is harmful if it is a sufficient basis to undermine confidence in
the outcome reached below. State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919-20 (Utah 1987).

D.

Insufficient Factual Basis & Unintelligent Plea

The factual basis for Rettig's guilty plea to aggravated murder, as set forth in the plea
statement was as follows:
[Incident to a scheme to commit robbery- of several fireanns from Mortensen,]
Bond told Mortensen to kneel down in front of the bathtub with his back to
us. While Mortensen was kneeling down, I was holding Mortensen at
gunpoint with Bond's handgun. Bond withdrew a lmife from his person and
then placed the lmife back in his pocket. At this point, Bond left the
bathroom, went downstairs and returned with a black-handled lmife
approximately 10 to 12 inches in length. Upon returning, I observed Bond take the
knije and slice Mortensen's throat. I am not certain how many times Bond cut
Mortensen's throat. After cutting his throat, I observed Bond stab Mortensen
in the base of his neck with the same knife.
R60 (emphasis added). The factual basis given orally by the State was essentially identical.
R410:29-30.
The factual basis used to support the entry- of a guilty plea to aggravated murder did
not indicate that Rettig acted with the mental state required for a conviction. The factual
basis clearly indicates that Rettig did not personally cause the death of Mortensen. The
factual basis also does not indicate that Rettig solicited, requested, commanded, or
encouraged Bond to cause the death of Kay Mortensen. For Rettig to be criminally liable for
the death of Kay Mortensen, the factual basis must clearly demonstrate (1) that Rettig
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intended Kay Mortensen to die or knew that Kay Mortensen would die; and (2) that Rettig
intentionally aided Bond to cause the death of Kay Mortensen.
The only allegation that may remotely point to Rettig's mental state is the allegation
that Rettig held Mortensen at gunpoint in the bathroom while Bond went downstairs. There
is no indication that Rettig knew Bond was retrieving a knife or knew what Bond intended
to do with the knife. It is stated that Rettig "observed" Bond kill Mortensen-not "assisted,"
"helped," or "aided," but "observed." Being a witness to a crime does not make Rettig a
participant in that crime, even if Rettig participated in other crimes.
Rettig's reaction to Bond's threatened killing of Roger and Pam Mortensen further
negates the elements of knowledge or intent. After Rettig had "observed" what Bond had
done to Kay Mortensen, once he fully understood of what Bond was capable, and finally had
knowledge or belief of what Bond intended to do, Rettig intervened to prevent Bond from
killing anyone else. R60-61;410:30-3L.It is clear from the factual basis submitted that,
although Rettig participated in burglary, robbery, and kidnapping, he lacked the mental state
required for commission of aggravated murder. He did not intend Mortensen to die and did
not know that Bond was going to kill Mortensen until it was too late.
By accepting the factual basis in this case as sufficient for aggravated murder and by
accepting the guilty plea, the district court violated both rule 11 and Rettig's right to enter an
intelligent plea.
The insufficiency of the factual basis should have been clear to the district court. At
the very least, dispensing with the obviousness requirement is necessary so that justice may
be done and Rettig's conviction for aggravated murder may be undone. Had the district
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court recognized the insufficiency of the factual basis, there is a reasonable probability that it
would not have accepted Rettig's guilty plea to the charge of aggravated murder.
CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, PRE:MISES CONSIDERED, Rettig requests that he be permitted
to develop the factual basis for his claim for ineffective assistance of counsel and that his
guilty plea be stricken or vacated upon his establishing he received ineffective assistance of
counsel Or, if ineffective assistance of counsel is limited to replacement counsel
withdrawing Rettig motion to withdraw plea, the C.ourt should reinstate Rettig's original
motion to withdraw his plea. Alternatively, the Court should strike or vacate the guilty plea
because it was based on an insufficient factual basis.
Respectfully submitted this 6th day of April, 2016.
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U.S. CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT VI
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public

trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defence.
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UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, SECTION 12
[RIGHTS OF ACCUSED PERSONS.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in
person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to
have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against
him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to
have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any
accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the
rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against
his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the
function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists unless
otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable
hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary
examination to determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release
of the defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule.
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UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE VIII, SECTIONS 3-5
Article VIII, Section 3. Uurisdiction of Supreme Court.]
The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and
to answer questions of state law certified by a court of the United States. The Supreme Court
shall have appellate jurisdiction over all other matters to be exercised as provided by statute,
and power to issue all writs and orders necessary for the exercise of the Supreme Court's
jurisdiction or the complete determination of any cause.

Article VIII, Section 4. [Rulemaking power of Supreme Court-Judges pro
tempore-Regulation of practice of law.]
The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence to be used in the
courts of the state and shall by rule manage the appellate process. The Legislature may
amend the Rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted by the Supreme Court upon a vote of
two-thirds of all members of both houses of the Legislature. Except as otherwise provided
by this constitution, the Supreme Court by rule may authorize retired justices and judges and
judges pro tempore to perform any judicial duties. Judges pro tempore shall be citizens of
the United States, Utah residents, and admitted to practice law in Utah. The Supreme Court
by rule shall govern the practice of law, including admission to practice law and the conduct
and discipline of persons admitted to practice law.

Article VIII, Section 5. Uurisdiction of district court and other courts-Right of
appeal.]
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except as limited by
this constitution or by statute, and power to issue all extraordinary writs. The district comt
shall have appellate jurisdiction as provided by statute. The jurisdiction of all other courts,

ADDENDUM C

both original and appellate, shall be provided by statute. Except for matters filed originally
with the Supreme Court, there shall be in all cases an appeal of right from the court of
original jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction over the cause.
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UTAH CODE, SECTION 77-13-6. WITHDRAWAL OF PLEA.
,..:JJ

(1)

A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction.

(2)

(a)

A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon leave of the court

and a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made.

(b)

A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest, except for a plea held in

abeyance, shall be made by motion before sentence is announced. Sentence may not be
announced unless the motion is denied. For a plea held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw
the plea shall be made within 30 days of pleading guilty or no contest.

(c)

Any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the time period specified in

Subsection (2)(b) shall be pursued under Title 78B, Chapter 9, Postconviction Remedies Act,
and Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
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4TH :<DISTRIQT CT ~ AF
'UTAH. COUNTY, STATE OF ·UTAH

l.· c.
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SENTENCING
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Audio
Tape Number.:
:2
:Tape count: 2-:55'
CHARGES
1. AGGRAVATED MURDER - ls't Degree Felony

.

Ple~i . c:fu.i'fty . -~

:D.i_i:1pp$it:iQ:r;;t:

0'~/02 /2.011

GuiJ.ty

-~ .... AGGRAVATED KIDNAP,;J:NG: .... la.t. Degre~: Fel.CJ:ny

Plea: Guilty

~- Di$pos,ition: 06/02/2·011 G:uilty

H~ING
Ti;t,is· :wat;:t~r coin~s 1>.~ior.e tlJ.e . cq~t fq:r $entencirig ~ Th~. cl~f.epd~t·
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The defendant. :adcb:esses. :the. court.
The defendant, is sentenced.

~-

SENTENCE.PRISON

J3ased c>ri. t,lie:! qe._terid~nt;/_L?. :pc;,ny~ct:~on 9f A~$V~'I'EP .fvIIDW,ER. jl ~-~:t
Degr~~ .,~10:q.y, tbe d<e.fepdant i~ a.e.ntence.~, to. .:a.n ipdeterniinat~ term
f:r;om 25· to Life years. in.

the Utah

State Prison.

Based ·on. ,the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED KIDNAl?lNG a ls.t
Degree·: Fel9Iiy1_ the defendant is sentenced to. an indeterminate term
qf ri.6~; less tq:an fifteen years ang wliid;i qi~y· l:>e i1fE!- ·.in tP.~; -'µ~~h
state Prison_. · ·
·
· ·
·
·
·· ··

the_ UT~ Cq~t.Y $heriff..: :Th~. d~.f.~11d~~t. ~s· remcµ)ded ._t:q_ yo:u,r
c;u_a~ody fo;r; tr~spqrtation t.o Jlj~ Uta,h 81::~~-e. PrisoA -wher¢ th:e
d~fendant will l;>e confined. ..

,To
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G,.,

Case ··No: :10110.1668 Date:

Dec 13, 2011

SENT~NCEPRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
The sentence i~ to run concurrently on·each count.

.
r;:.,

SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE

The court. recommends a<finf3 of $10000. o.o on cowit 1 and a fine· of
$100Cl0 •. Od ·ori count ~. The. couxt also recomrriep.ds. ret:ititution in the
amo:unt. of $10671 .. 71 for Crime Victimes Reparations. Restitution is
to be joint and :several. Parole is recommended .
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nH C-IS iRIC.T
STATE OFU'TAH

.RfTHE FO'QRTH JUDlciAL DISTRICT COURT'

UiAH CQUNTY

UTAH COUNTY,STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,.

S'fAtE~,QFO.EF~:N.DA.NT

)N .SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA OR

Nd CONTEST A.NI) CERTIFIC.ATB OF

::Plam,filt

COUNSEL
vs.
Case No.101101668

Judge noqias Low

t>efendant

I, Benjamin David Rettig, herel;>y aclm<>.wl~dge anq cer:tifythatihave been advised of
and that I und~stand the following facts and)ights: .
Notification of Chat2es

.DegreeMm/M~ Punishme;nt,

C~e & SfaU:1,t~ry Provisions·

Fine+90o/o surcharge
Criminal Homicide,, Aggravated Murder

NfaxpllUI11 penalty is dea~ life without the

Fl

b.c.A. §76~5-202

possibility of par<;>le Qr an mdeten:nittate
prison term ofnotless than 25 yearsWbi~h
maybe for life. Fine of$20,0QO. tto;oeo

7u
Aggravated'1Gdnaping
. .
.
.

.

Maximum p~natt:y is·life without parole o,:-

.Fl

.. rl. . . $, .t "'rs,
-~ years
T,.,rto life.
,r1,Fine

D@'}

of~O,0QQ.Jft9~-~

1'b~
·1·
...

v _
__ :

JJ.

l.)ll

-~

rt:t ~bt

1
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000062.

____________Exp~atoey::N9te____________
Wh,en_prop.m.-ly filled. out; the following Statement of Defendant in Support-of Guilty Plea
contains afi th~r~ein~ts of~W~ U(e), Utah:R..µ1~:of._G.ri~al.I.>.roc~ui~.Jfth~Di~ct.
Court chooses fcn:-ely 01:t'this statement for pmposes ofstclct.oompliance ·With Rule 11, it must
1liake thcffacf.krio~ on the record by·refemngto-'1:he stater.nenton the·record asking defendant if
he or she read, understood and acknowledged the ·cont~ts of the statement· If the defendant
canµ9t .~ or µnderstand English, ·the Court should ascertain '.on· the record that the• statement
li~ 'been.te,a4pf ~ated tc{the-defendant. Altho~gh this {orin is for a guilty or no oon~t ple~
itmaybe.adapted.forAl/ord pleas~
□ E~qeable. Sec.ond Offense. (Onlyµ checked:;)

ifI ·am cofrvided··...in
the
future oftbis:same
corivictfon
will
' lknowthat
..... ·. ...·.' ..
.·.. ·· .
,•,
.. :·
. .-:··.
·.
. crime
. . .. , the·secorid
·... ·.: .·'.
. .. .
.
be a [Class __ Misdemeanoror _ _ Degree Felony.] The maximum penaltyf~r that ·crime··is
.

,•

.

.

,:

.

,, ,·

.:

.

•.

:

-.

(

•.·.. ....

·~:

'

-

·'

•'

..

•'·

.

..

·

·

-

.

.

-

.

','

'

.

.

. .

:

:

lhereby··acknowledge and certify that lhave been advised of and'th.at I understand the

rolJ,owµigJ~ctfand:Jigh.ts_: · ·

Eiements of Offense
I haye r~eived:a-'copy of the:_(Amended) Information ·against 1ne~ .I have read it,, Qr h~:it ·
read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of crime(s) to which I am pleading
guilty. ' .',
'
. . ,
.' '
. .
The elements ·of..the crlnie(s)
to
which
l
atrrpleacling
gnil.ty -~e:
. .
..
.
..
'

.

'

'

'

Cotm.tl: Cninhial Homicide, Aggravated Murder . . . .
.
_ _
1) On or·abotifNovember'l6;'2009;in Utah Counfy, Utah, I intentfonallyorlm.0W111gly:caused
the dea~ of ari.othetodnteritionallyaided another person· fo intentionally orlm.owingly cause the
death of another and,
·
•· ,
2) the homicide was _committed incident to an act scheme, course of conduc~ or criminal
episg~e.4{$.g which the a~tor co~tted or a«emp~ed to 991Dllljt aggr,ava:ted robbecy, r61'bery,
aggravated burglary, burglary; agw.avated kidnaping, or kidnaping;
·
~fthe ho~9i~e· ~oµnnitleq_ fo.r p~l:llli~ gahi;.. .
.
4,ffiehoroidde was committed m.m ~speci:aIJ.y:eemo~, maia:as, Sftlel, et eKeeptienally ·
O:et9._r~.-.l~e._: m
. - .~.er, ~n3. ,o~.::s~~~chm.ll~tb_e~emonshated.. h.YJ»ly··.~icai t.vtt;me, sefiousphys~
-;ah:;~H; m: seg01Js· bodily ~:ar,· eff:he netim befvxe detl.th
· ~ ~ 1 L,Y-

was

CountlfAggravated Iudfulriing,

l)J)not. about' November:J61 2009,,fa Utah County Utah, during the course ofcommitti,ng
unlawful d~tention .or kic4la.pilig;' I-cJid:
-.·
. .
..
·

2) possess,. use; or threaten to ustfa dangerous wea.'.p.on.as defiiied-·in Utalf Code Section 7 6~1o01; or
·
3) act Witb:intent:

2.,
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.•

(~) t~ ;facilitate the commfssio~ attempted commissio1,1; or flight after qozµniissi9n pt ~enip~ed

colllllll$.sion.of ~ JelQny;

··

(b) to hind~ or dela.y .the q.iscovezy ofotreporting of a felony;

(c) to infilctbodily~jury--on·orto.terrorizethe'7fotitn Qr.~9ther.
Adniitted Facts

th.8:i 'by pJ~l.l-g, gqjlty,. I am ,adrn1ttmg thatJ committed the thregoing
~e(s). (Qrdf I am pleadmg n9 contest, I am not contesting that I pc,µnnitt,aj.,_tht, fcm~gtj~g:
crlmeS;:)lstipulate and agree· (or,jf l a.m·pl~4itig ri~ ~*-t~t, ~ do ~o,~ d,i$µt~ or ~ntest) thatthe
1 uncl~d

following facts describe my conduct and 1h.e conduct of other. persons for. which I an;i c,::imiitally
liable.. These facts providea~basis forthe Court to accept my guilty{or'no contest) piea(s)·and
]?rove the ~lenients of the cri.me(s) to which I am pleading guilty (ot no contest):

On or about November 16, 2009, M.t;l'f#li Bpnd(''B/n:z!l") @d ltr.f-O'ele,fin:Bon.d'., vehicle.front
VemaJ,·.Utalt. ,() lfay],,fprtilt$.~'s (''Mortensen'?, ho1!1,e in Spanish· Fork, Utah. ,T/tepurpo~e ir.i, ·
frayeling to MiJHensen/s. honte was to steal ft;reo.rm$ l<J~ated. in . !4p11eJ~en~s r.,.011~_4-: Upon,
ariivilig at,M:ortensen's home~ Bond indicate{l_he·w()uld iiiitiidly enter·the home and then.I
Wll$ ig follow him and 'also enter the home. Iionil an.di entertd tile bome wi,!hout being bivitetl
tind we had a handgun wit~ us. Pond placed zip #es 011/ Mort_enseit atid both ojus ,were:
wearing ski masks and latex gloves in order to hide our identities. We commanded Mortf]M,~~
to show us where his firearms were iocated. Moi1en$ei:, to()k JlS to a cunke,r located bt;~iif!l his
home. and 'We obse,,,ed several_ ·weapons. We took Mortensen jr(Jm the bunker and back into
his :home~ After :re:..entering the home, :we took Mortensen upstairs to ·a bathroo~ 11.0.nd. told
JJ{~rlensen to kneel down in front' of the bathtub with his back to ut _Wnib{lJ{~fte~e.n ~~
kneeling down, I was holdzng Morten.ten at gunpoint with JJon.if.'s :handgun. Bond 'withdrew a
knife front his p~r~°'!' and then placed dte knife back in Ms.pocket. At thispoin~ ~ond _leffthe
bizthrooliti went downstairs and returned -with a black.;.h_andled kttif'!t appro,ximate~ J(J' to 12
inches in kngifi:- Upo,~ r(ftriniing, ['observed Bond take-the knife a11.d slice Mortensen !$,tl~ro.~
f .q11f'fi<4. ¢.~rt.~· 'how 'iitttfiyi:,times Bond cut' Mortensen's th,ro~ ;After c.iitti11,g his thtota, I
observedB01tdstab Morknsen 'in tlt~hase ofhis fleck with tlt'e :sa11te ltnzfe.

$hottly· (!,jtet~'Bond 'cut and·.stabbed Mortens~,i, we.}t~{lr4 Si}lne~#t knock 01.i .m:e fr~iit door~ t
raitiiownst¢.r.s.tin.4 !.u.4.. l>el#ntl.. Pi.~ frqnt door,p,1id :,Jp1td.ope11ed· the . do:o_r. Ajeni~ :fl.1tifmfzJe.:
were· itt 'ffee. door. asking/or Motteiisett. (.(,~r·if.iS.cQVeret{ tht#.Jh~ i~4fyi4.utf4'' ~efe. p~~lq.
and Roger Mo1·iensen.) Twas stiltho_ldbtg• th¢ liaff-dgti.if ~h,eii :J.itiiiiela and Roger eitter~d the

ltPIJ1:~ I infofined Paniela·and Roger:that Mortensen was upstairs andt1t!z,i h~ JY~:.iJkay.. "fYe.
·told tltem to·walk into tlte suuken living roi!,m 41id we plt;ice4, zip ties on Pamela,s and.Roger's
.h~n4s 0:11}!.fe.e.t· 4l siJ~e'jio/itt, Bond :~ame· .out o/ the ldtch'en .with a,iQ.fher-JqjJfe wn}ch.: 1
believed lte ·was going to use to kill Pam.ti.la ,ma ~oget~ 1 steppe4. i,1J:fr.ottt ofBond and told 'him
not kill Pamela and B.,;igef.: 'W/t'ile :Pan,.el~ and Roger were tied up in the livfi,.g\r.oo,n, '!
remained iii. the living' Niont: with them holdm.g fhe. handgun while._ ,[J'!"(l4 . ,:~~oved
approximately ZS. .of Mortensen.'s weapons (including Jia,ulguns u.11.d tijlesJfrrnn.. fhf!., b.J11:tkftr
a~d placi,(tliem ir/ Bq1t4's veiiicie.- We also took ammunitionfrom the bunker; A.fteip!a~pig
the guns and ammunition in}Jo.hil:'s vehicle, we tookR.oger's driver's license:and told'JiinJttnd
3
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Pan;teu.i .ilu!t. tfiey. n¢~ck.4 to tell tlte police· that three black 1it'en !tad· 'lied die11i ·up and. if they
told ~ piilj¢¢· a t!iffer.e,iit ·story, ··we knew where :they lived .amt. we, ·wo.u.14. ·¢.om~ pt.¢1' and kill
them.
left Moi#nsen's resiilen~e and.i/fP,ve_ back #J Yem.~ ,Oi;•. ~~r:wa, back to·:vern~4
stopp~d at ii rest ~op.#Jjd.d.Jsc.arde4 o.ur·glo:ves in a.dumpster. In T{emai,-Bond~m.tdl_ W.~.~t µp ~
ctu;:yon and buried the Weapons•. Following :-this, Bo11:d .t(}Qk.- ,ny h_q(!rJ.l/qnd shoes in orddr .to
dispose of.item.

We

we

.

. _

J $ ent~g

_.

Waiver of Comtitu.tional Rights

tbisJthese. plea(s) agreement -voluntarily.

l undei:~tand that I -~ye the
following rights under the ·constitutions pf!Jt~ ~d th~ J)'njt¢d ~µi~.- IJls9 understand that if t .

. plead guilty (or no contest) I will ·give up all the following rigb.ts:

·

CounseL 1lmow that I.have the right to b_e represented by an atto;rney and.that if I ·cannot
afford on.e.; an, attomeywill be ·apPointed by the' court at no cost to me. I tmderstand ~2:fl ~ght
later, tf thejudge determined that I was able, 1,¢ required to: pay,f.or -~f appointed 1aw.yers
service, fo :JD.e.
11:iave not waived my right to counsel.
1 - ~ J·ha.ve re~ tms· statm.ent and that lundetstandthe:nature ·and .~lem~ts. of ~e

cl:tai-ges and crimestowhichI am pleading·guilty~ l also 1,lllderstand"riiyrlgp.t$iifUrls case and the
cons~uences ofmyguilfyplea.

-

.

.

If l have not waived my right to couns~l, my a.ttor;qpys -_ ar~. fyii,chael Esplin, Stephen
Frazier- and Anµ._Boyl~/¥.y a'fttjri.leys and I ll~ve fully discussed ·this· itatement, my-rights and the

ci)n,sequ$ri~~ of m.twJty ptea.

Ju.ry Ti:i~ _I :kg.ow .U,lat I have a right to· a speedy and public trial by
(uilb.iased) jury ·and that f wili be:giving up th.at r.igh~ by pleading guilty~

m,i

imp¢iat

~<>i1fr.ontatioli and cross~examinati.on of-wifu_esses. Lknow thaHfI were to have a jury.
Jrlal, a) lwouicfhave the.right fo see and obsefye-the,· ,wifuesses who testified against me: and·b) .
nii,attom~y, Qtni~~lf ifI waiyed myrightto an attorney, wcruldhave the opportunity to .cro~s~
exam.in~ all of the witnesses in open court wlio tesp.fied ag~iristni¢!

)light-to compel wifrlesse·s. I know· th.art if Lw~rt,: to :~av~_J1 jw.:y tri~, I c.cnlld_ c~
witnesses.·•if.l chose to and I:would 'be ~ablttto obtaµi subp_oe.na,s r ~ g the attendance and
~qny Qf tp.ose vyiµiess·es. If:! couid not· affotd to pay fQr the wifuesses'tQ appear,·the State
would pay·fhose costs~

· ·.

· ·

R.igbt to testify and.pr.ivU~ge. ~gajnst self-incrilniiti.it!ott. I ~o:v:(th,at tf:I Were to have
a;trlal, lw.ould have th~ :rigl?_t-to: t~stify ·on my own behili. ·t also:·1cnow.-thai-if i .chQse ~ot,.w
~estlfy,· rio one could make me testify or make .m~ ·give evi.den.qe :~gai,rl,st:p;ty~~lf, ~s,o. ~QW .that
if I chose not to t~,: the jury would be told :that they could 'liot·nold my refusal- to testify

·~gainst me~

·

4
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Presuntption of innocence ~4 bur.den :of:proof. I know-thaf ff:l: do:.not plead guilty~ ·I
am ptes-Qlned .innocent_tj).tjlthe 'St~t~:proves thad am.:guilty·pf the .chatgeclcripie(~). If I ~hoose ·
to fight ¢e ~ges against me, tneed only pl~dflnofguilty," ,and m.y case will:be: set for a trial.
At a :trial; the State ~ould ·have the burden ·of pro~g each element 9.f the ~~ge(s) ~eyon4 a
reasonable doµbt If-the trial is before a jury, the. verdict .must be urianirno11S, meaning-that each
juror would have to find me guilty.
·
··
I understarid that if t plead ,guilty; I: give )ip th.e pt.e~umption ofinnocence· and will be

admftting 'that I COinlllltted

.~e crift).e(s) stated: above.

Appeal. I know that under th~ Ut$ ~e>n.stitution, ifTwere convicted by aJury or judge, I
would: have the ij~tt6 appeal my conviction and :sentepce. ~ lce>:uld not afford-~~ costs of an.
app¢.al, the, State worild pay those .costs for me~ By·pleadiilg guilty; I .understand my. ngl:1t to
appeal.is limitoo. I ~q~andthat I a.in giving·up·my right to app~ m.y~nvictionfflple~
guilty. J ~a~4 that if I wish to appeal my sentence, I niusf file notice of appeal yiithin 3'0
days after my sentence is enterecl~

.lkifow anif understand -that by pleading guilty; l_tmt waiving and giving: up all the

statutorjand ·constitudona·z rigli-ts ·as e#,!tiJ,ied ahove.
Consequences

of Enterl.ne: a Guiltv Plea

Potenµal_ penalties~ t.know the maxim\11.ll s~tence·th,~.t tnay be imposed for each crime
to whichla.1i1 pleading guilty~ I know ·that by pleading guilty to a crime:tp.af carries a.Ilia,ng~tory
penalty; I will be sµbjecting µi.yself to serving a mandatory penalty for ~at ¢rime. Tknow my
$·ei_it.¢nce ~ayincludtra prison tettn, fine, or. both.
.

. JUndeci.~4 that ifI am ·not a T..tmted States .c;tlzen, my pJea(s) today may; or even will,
subJect.me :.to· deportationJmd~ the 1Jmt¢. ~~t¢s ira,migration laws and. regulat.io.n.s,.:or othffle
·adversely ·affect:my irr.rrnigra#o.:o.·:~tatus;· which may include pennanently baµ;irlg·my.t~~entry into
the: United States~. i understand; th11t' if•I. )iave. questions ·about the effect :of my ple~ 011. 111y
immig;ration status; I should consult witl;i an immigration attorney.
..

l know that in addition to a· fm.~, a r.ii.n.~t'Y· percent (90%): surcharge W,ill l,e imposed
tQgeth~r with a·security 'fee of $33.00 for each· offense to-which.I ¥.ve plead gajlty., I also kn:ow
that I maybe ordered to make.restitution to any-victi:in(s)ofmYcrimes, includmgany-I.'estitiition
that may be .owed on charges that are dismissed as part of a plea agr~~ment.
.
Consecutive/concµrr¢n~ :prijon :t~rms~ Iknow ·that if':th,er~ i~

~o.r~ 't:b.aji,.011e crime·

inyoN~ t;h~ _sent_ences may be· imposed one aft.~t ap.Qth.~t:(CQASe¢titively),.or.-.they:mayrun at th~

same·time .(conCU1TenUy). 'l kn,ow ·th~ I ·may b:e charged.an-,a:dditiona1 fine. ;for.:,ea.~h. 6rµne thatl
.,Pl~~d. Jo.. l Ql$q know·tluit if 1 am on probaH9n, 9r.ym;9l~,. pr awaiting: sentencing on another:

.olf~~ of which I have been convicted or wbich I li~ve ·plead guilty~ my guilty :Plea(s) ,now ~Y'
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r~t in :consecutive·sent~ces being·ilnpQ~ec:l qp)ne. Ifthe offense to· which I 'amnow·pleadmg
guilfy;,q~¢4w.ijen I wa.s--imp~<>neci.01.= on parole, tknow tb.e1aw·requir~·~e ctjl#tl~.impose
c;ol;i$~c.ti.tl.Ye s~tences unless the; court ·finds eiid. $tates ·on tli~ record tµ~t 'ccmsecutive-.sentences
would be.inapp:roptiate.

Plea Agteem~nt. My guiltypl~ is the result of. a plea ba,rgajn lletw·eenmyself.and the
·prosecutiµg aU.9m~y. NlJ:p.tfpro~~es., duties~ and provisiollS otthe plea b~gain are-fully
c.on~~•#i·tbis plea '~eemeri~:mcluding tho$e explained below:
I.n exfh4n~~for 11!-Y KTfiffi>.''P.leas, the stt4~ ofUtah a$f.ees ~Pt t() ~e.ek. the,4e~t1Jpf!~alty
(nJfi~ cas,e.-Iit:additio~ the Stak. <JfUtab wf,l{re~om11tettd to the Court that I receive apena/.zy
ofnot·'les$ .fhtµi. 'ZS-yea,s, t~ life. w.#iJ :th~-pos.sibili'IJ' ofparole. The State of U'tl:lh will: also
.
recomntend to the C<iurl that the charges ofAggr.av~d.MJlT:4.<#f cµid Aggravated Jruinaping·
run concurtenily witli each otlter. ·Finally, ifI receive a:,subpoen:a to testify against Maran

Bon.,z;: {agree to appear and testify ti-uthfully.

T~ jl.J<}.g~ not 90_$~ I ~OW: that any charge or sentencing concess.ion 0~
re~mmendation <5-f pro~ation or:susJ?ended._s~tence, .in~l1~diµg :a,;eductj.91l.pfi}i~ charges for
-sentenclng, made or ~ougp.t b.y either d~fense oounsel ot the prosecuting attorney are"no_t binding
.on:the judge. I-also know th.at _any <>pinions they express to me ag.fo what.tli¢Y,belieye the judge
n;iay :do are not binding on the judge.
·
Defendant;s ·Certification of Voluntariness·

I am· entering· this. pl~· ofm,y_ ·o_Wll fr~ :wi)J m,td·. cJioi®-: No force, threats, of ·un1awful

·mflµ~,.Qf ~Y.k.4id ~v~ l?eeti...m?de to g~ ;me to., plead gmlty (or :110 co_ntesO~ 'N<i p:r9.ri:µs~
e~~Hhose contained hi this pleaigreemerit het,V.tfboo,il iriad~'fo.ine~
··
·
. ihctv~ i~¢Jltl~ _$~fJ.Je~ent, .ci~ I-hav_e had it read to me by·an attom~y? and l µn,cl~and ,its
co:iitenfs?and. adopt ,each·plea,agreement in it as my own. 1•jpiow .that I am free to. cnange,.or
delete ·anything contained in this plea a~eement, but I do not wish to make any changes becaµs¢
ail of the statements :are correct. .
r$.:~~n,ixfwifu the advice and assistance:of my attorney. . .
·
t.am. .-2.J_y~ars ~fig~. I have ~ended school through the. &~:wade~ :I_can·tead
aJ1d µnd~s~d t}le E:ngli~ language. If I do not und~4 English, ~ iriterpteter:hcts been
p1:9vided·to·.me~ :i·was-no.t.under th~ infh1~~e. of any ~gs, 'niedication, or.intoxicru,.ts w.hich
·w.o.wd j:rnpa.ir my :j-qdgr.ri~t 1\'hen I decided. to plead guilty. I ~ 11dt .presei;itly under the
'influence of any:dtug, medication, orfatoxicants wllich impair.my judgment.
:I. believe myself to:· b.e· of sound and discerning mind .and to be n;i~~y gwapJ~: pf
ui;ld~~ding these proceedings· and the consequences .of my pl~~ I ~ free of:: any meriW
disease, ;-defect, od~pairmeri.t that ·wollld prevent me from underst~ding what I -~ 4oing or
from. khowµigly, intelligently,· and voluntariiy entering my plea.
I understand that if I
to withdraw my guilty pleas(s), l can file a writte:o. mo.ti.on fo

want

with.4.r.~w):r1y·pl¢a.(s) before sentence is annowiced. Tunder~iarid ·fu..atfot'-a ple~ iil aheyance, a.
motion to withdraw··froin the:pt~,agreeinent mtist be 'rn8,'Ae \vi.thin 30 days of pleading.guilty. or
no ;QOµt~$1~_J,~ only b.e allow~d to 'withdraw ·my P,lea ifi show that it was noflo;1owingly· ~d
Q:
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vol¢it@.yma4,~. l~ei"stari4:fu.at_.a11y· cb,alle;ige to ~yplea(s) ~~e:-~er SeiitencitJ_g'mUSt be
pUISUed under the Post-Conviction1lemedies Ac.tin Title 78, '.Chapfor 35~ and Rule. (>SC Qf th~·
Utah R\lles Qf,Civil Pr.9~edure.
·
Dated this ,,.....I____ day of 1ime

.!2·0·11·:·: . ·.· .

~.~
.· .✓

~~~
~

PE:fE@AN,T.

.Certificate of Defense Attornev ·

I certify thaf.I am the attorney for Benjamin.DavidRettig;.thede.fendant above, alld.-f~atI
know,J:ia/she;~•.~ea4 the plea agreement or'that ~ have read it to him~1#·; I 1*-V.¢ :~s¢~sed it..
with runi/h~·and believe that he/she fully illiderstands·the meaning-of its.contents and is
mentally and physically ·competent To the best of.my'knowlec:lge.~d pe~¢f,: a.fig @-•approprlaie
mvestigation,.th~ elem~ts of the ctjxrie(s)~d the facfualsynops~s ~f the defend~t'fcri,mmal
conduct are correctly stated; and these~ along with the other representations an~ dec.l~ ·
mad~ by:the defendant-in the fotegoing affidav.it, are acettrate and

Certificate of .ProsecutiilgAttomev

I certify .that 1 am the attor.riey fo(the. :State pf V~:m the: case agam,st J3ehj~,Da·~i4·
Rettig, tlie 9~(end~t. J have reviewed tliiip~ea,agreemen.t and:::find: that the: factual :basis of:the
defenclani~s ;ciuninal conduct which· constitutes Jh,e:J>ff.em..e(s) ·is 'true -arid· co;rrect. :NoJm.p~pet
irid,ucem¢iits, ~~ts, or coerciqµ. to encourage a plea ha$ ·been offered defendant The•.,piea
negotiations are fully contained in this plea ·agre(mlent.or as· supplemented on th~;reqqr:d b~for~
the <2o~ Ther~is reaso~able.~use to pelieve that ~e evidence wo1,1ld support the ~n_victiot,1 of
defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/ate entered and that the acceptanc~ of the
plea(s)
would serve the p:ublic interest
-·
'

·.:

~ l ~·"
OEPUTY UTAH;CODN1Y ATIORNEY
Bar No. · j"C/6 t ·
· ·

~ . -..· . · ...;._..·.. ·
· ' . · · ; · ~

ORDER
B$ed on the facts set forth·:m-ihe,foregomg_plea f!gree~en.t ~d the·cerlin~atlori:of ~e
d~feµdanfancl C9tlhSel; im.dbE1$ed "611 any pral representations in .c.ourt,: the Court witnes~~._the
signatures and finds that the defendanes guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are.freely,·. lmowfugly,
·,·.,.
.

:

.
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and voluntarily.made.
IT IS liERE'.BY' ORDER.BP tb~thed~fei;idan.(s. ·gunfy (orntj COll.te$t): pl~(s) 'to the,
.sefforth in .the.plea agreement-be: ae~tecland entered.
' . ·•.· ·

crim~(~)

Da~.tbis

.;;L,. 'day.of

~

:if
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GASE NO. 10110166.~

DEPT. AMERICAN FORK - #.2

2
3.

IN. TI-IE :FQ9.1:(';i.'Il.· Dr$'1'.RIC'l' COUR~ Il;-1 :AND

fl:

FOR UTAH COUNTY, . STA'I'E _OF ,UTAH;

5

6.
7

----00000-----

Plaintiff,

8

H

).
)
)
)

THE STATE OF 1J'l'AH,

TRANSCRI];'.T

)

'VS.

OF
ENTRY OF PLEA

)

10

11

12

)

BENJAMIN 'DAVID

RETTIG,

J
)
)
)

Defendant.

------------

13.

:1_4
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2
3

4

1 enters yourplea today?

FOURTH DISTRICT COURT--AMERICAN FORK.
tJTAHCOUNTY,STATEOFUTAH

'·THURf-86'X:a~NE 2•· 2011

• ·,fr··~

5
P RO CEE D I.N G·s
6
~ **
7
THECOURT: We1llcal1the.cas~ofStat~·ofUra~
8 versus Benjamin Rettig. This is case 101101668. Jfcounsel
9 will please state their appearances for the record.,
:10
MR. ESPLIN; .Mike EspHnJor the defendant,

11

12

MR. FRAZIER: Stephen Frazier°Un~udi~~)~

THE COURT: And Mr. Rettig Is here as weil?.
13
MR. ESPLIN: Yes.
14
THE COURT: The State~
15
MR. TAYLOR~ Tn:nTayfor on b.ehat.fof theSta~e.
16
MR. NIELSE_N: John Nielsen for the, state.~
17
THE COURT:. All_righ~ thank you. The C9urt's pE).en
1~ notified that the defendant inten~s to change his pie.a today;
19 rs that correct,· Mr. Esplin?
20
MR. ESPLIN: That's correct, Your-Honor
21. Onaudibie).
22
THE _COURT: Would you like to proceed frqrp the
23 podium?
24
MR. ESPLiN: Yes.
25 ·
·THE COURT: Who is going to state :the natur~ of th

2
3
4
5

· ··

·

THE: DEFENDANT: Yesj sit
~E COURT: We'll Qo through thatin moredetaff in

artjoment

Is. that th.~S}ateis und~rs~J:Kling of the agreement.

6 Mr. Taylor'.?

7
8
9
10
11
1~
.13
14

15

. .. .

.
Yes, it.~,J~Qge~
THE COURT~ Can ljust ask: you, Mr. Taylor. has th~
victim's family been consulted regardfrig.· this disposition?
MR~· TAYLOR: Y~. JiJdge~ T.fle:v~rn'$ vn.ctow is
here. Darla Mortensen, and we.have also some·other exten.4.ed
family. We have talked with the.rn. :w.13:hwie taiked about Ulis
resolution, and the.y have been Onaudible)._
THE COURT: Do'yoli know if:any of them desire to
speak today in regards-not to any proposed senteooo.·
necessarily today but just in regards to the proposed plea
,agreement? All right, thank you~
Mr. Rettigi we te going to :falldo. you now for some
moments here. if I could have the clerk administer an oath
to you. Canwejustfree.hisrighthand•justforthe
administration of the oath? If you'd like! itcould be
resecured after the oath has been administered..
Can you raise your right hand, pfea$e.

MR.JAYLO.R:

16
'17
18.
19
20
21
·22:
:23·
24 111
.25 Ill

1

4

2

·1 ~greement?· Would yo~ like to or would you like Mt Taylor
·'2 to?
··

•~

A:

MR. ESPLIN: Sure, Your Honor. ·ws our
underst~ndfng that the State is going t~::~1e an Amencf~cl

Information - weve received a copy of thaf"'."' which Wlll.
result in the dismissal of Counts 3 and 4 to the lnformaNon:
and will allege count 1. criminal homicidi~ aggravated murder,
and Count 2, aggravated kidn~pping, bQth first.idegree
9 felonies, one acapital
-a'fi~f~egre.~:~ro~y~:
.10 .
.In addition to lh~t. the agree.m~nt WQti}c(ti~ ~fated
11 wiUt the plea ·stateme11t which has been prepared i_Q to!s case
12 that the· State would. aisorecommend in return fodtie
13 defendant's pleas of. giJil~ to those lWo amended char9es
14 wquld recomrnend thaHh.ey Wo~ld notseek. th¢' death' penalo/ In
15 this case and wouia· r.ecomrne·nd Ulafthe qefendijrit ~calve a
5
·. 6
7
8

1 V\/hereupon,
2

eef-lJAM1N RETIJG,
3 was administered the follqwing oath byth,e_c,qurtcfelk.:
4
THE. ~LERK: You do solemnly-swear that the·
5 testimony you gi.ve. you're aboutto give in this case .now
6 pending before the 'court will be the truth, the whofe truth.
7 and nothing but the truth so help you God.

8
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.9....·•·. ..... . TH; co4RT: Thank
Mr. Rettig, jtistto make .
'10 s~re you'r~l aware, ttie purpos·e. of the hearing· today ts for' .
11 you to enter a. ·guiliy piea - or guilty pleas to two·ofth~ .
.12 State;s four charges against you. In order to. do th.is,: it'.s.
13 necessary that I confinn that you understand everythln.g
·14 that's happening and all the consequences of your pleas
·1.5 today, If you. do not understand something; please just let
16 penaliy of notl¢sftha'ri°2ij ye~rs. t~ l~_Wit)l;tb,e. .. . . .
1,6 me know, and Iwili e~deavorto·ma.k~.:~ure:lliaf y9ti_~rf.
17-. possibil,ity of p~rpl~:"il.aJ$QJecomm~~d.·thatthe.C.IJ~rge, o.f
·17 understand Jfi If you ever need.a defay or a chari~_.tp:~lk
1a· aggrav~ted murde.r and aggravated ,kidnapping run.co~~rr~ntly J~ .to your cou~sel .at any tirne, you can ·do .so there ~tJh~
19 with each other. And that's the basis of the agreement
f9 podium orwe·~n t~ke.-~:recess.and you can talk in private.
20
THE COURT:. All right, thank you..
20
C.an I just.ask how old you are?·
21
Mr.' Rettig, is that your understanding of. the
21
THE DEFENDANT~: I'm 23.
22. ~greern,erit?.
. ..
.
·
·22
THE COURT: And. how far did you go: in s·chool?:
23
. . .THEO~Fl;NDANT: Yes~$i(.
·... ·.·.. . . 2$
THE DEFENDANT}. ,Finis~eclltle 11th grade~
24
. TH:E COiJRf: .-An.d.yo~)iridtn~fand tp~ ¢0.n~qu~o
MR E.SPllN:. I-!·~ ~98$'have·~ G~p~
25 yoijr pie~ today if you do ~ccept'that offer an~ th~ .Court,
2s·
THE COURT; How long hav~ y()u haq tiJ~tGEOJ

felony, cine

oi~,

~:(' }f3Ef.1:l ;COQK, •

yotr

aPR

i6l ?P~ID~N@UM~r

. (4:~~l :~,6.EJ,-q.1)75
CitY1.

t/T '~:?7~9

5'

1
·ntE DEFENDANT:. Since the 11th grade. . .
1
. Mfl TAY.LOR:· Judge,.Qpunt 1, Ul~ aggraval.ed. m~f(fer,
2
THE COURt:.: Arid you can·read and write the:Eng 2 ~?viously is Kay Mortensen.: Cou.l)t·z:~ agg~va~
3 language?·
·3 kidnapping, applles.ro·Roget'and'Pamela Mortensen. .
4 .. -- . THE OEFl;NDANT: Yes, ~ir..
4
. lHE COURT: So botll Roger'and:PameiaMortensen h!
5
THE,.COU.RT:' Have YQU ta~en ~my alcofiol .or drugs i •. p b~11 included in CQiin.t2, iQU8$$. aritt: Count 3 Which would
~ fhe·last 48 hours?
6 tel.ale 't9 another one is being dismis~~ Tha, is: ~o
7 ·
:THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. .
..
7 classified as a first~egree felony.- The minfmurn penalty
8
;THI: COURT: :Any other medicine that could affect .8 that attaches to this offen·se is presumed to be aprisoo·term
·9 your ability to qnderstand whatYoifarer doing today?
9 ofnot ress than 15 years and which may be for life.
19 . . ·nte DEFENDANT: No,
10
Howev~r•.if the CQurtfinds.'thala lesserterm is
_i 1
. THE COURT: Do you currently have any .nie~tal;
11 io:the i~te.rest ~f ju$flce and if I state th~ reasons for .. : .
1? emotional or physical problerl)s or issues that could interfere
J2 thal.ffhdilJg on the record, tJ)en I coukf impose a tenn of
1~ wtth your ability fo'understand what is happening here today? 13 imprisorurient:of not fess than ten·years and which may be for
14
THE DEFENDANT: No.
14 life'and of nofless than six years which may be for life.
15
THE COURT: :Has anyorie forced, ttireatenedot
15
(Off-the-recoro bench conference.)
16 ¢arced you in any\vafinfo entering these pleas that are:
16 .
. . l}IE. COURT: . rAr. Reffi.g, your·counsel has requested
:17 pi'Qposed)9~ay? . . .
..
1.t a briefrecess'lo look. at the potential penalties for
18
THE QEFENDJ\Nr: N<>,
.
. . 1~- ~ggray~te4 kidoapping. Welll do that. and ~nvene as soon
19
THE COURT:., .· }fas any~n~ made any p_romrses ,tQ yo .. as we're ready.,
. ..
20· connection With·your guilty pleas-other than tttose· that
20
(Whereupon, a recess was .taken~).
.
21 Mr. ·Esplin has already stated on thetecord?
21
MR.ESPLIN: We believe that the Court is correct
22~
· ·11:f~J>EF'=NDANT: Nt>~, . ...
..· . . .. 22 onJh~t ~ing the s.tatu~, ~nd we
modiJl~ the statement
2~
THE, ~OU~T: . Are you, in• fact. intending enter· 23 of ev~nts t9 allege m~imum, penalty is fife wjthout par9le or.
24 ·-these.pleas of your ownJree win and choice?
24 15 years to fife. I've explained ·that t~. the defendant, and
25
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
25 I've explained that the Court can in· this·case (inaudible)

,ir.~

~av~

to

6

8

1

THE-COURT:·. -.fave you had'an opportunity to clearl 1 appropriate six or tenJears.
2 disCllss this plea ·$gr¢emeotwilh:Yoot ~tt0,rrieys?
2
· THE COURT: Thaok'you-:A.n.g yo~\1e initiated that
,3- . .
°THE.DEFENbANif i have~ . . . . 3 ch~:ng'e orf that document Mr. Rettig?'
.
.
4
THE COlJRT: . And you understand lhe terms ofth~t ·. 4 . - . . . THE DEFENDANT: ·1 have•.
5 agreement? .
'• . . ..
5
THE COU.RT: , Do you. understand then the penalties
6 ·
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. . . . .
. 6 for ihe offense of aggravated kidnapping? Should I go over
7
·THe COURT:: in· Count 1 of the Information, you hav 7 those again'- Mr. Esplin, or do .you think that.he -8 been ~arged ~ and I und~tan_d even in the Amended
a
MR. ESPLIN: I think he understands. Do you
-~. informa.tio~•y~u wiU :~~ ~h~rgeqwith ~ggravateq murder which 9 understand?
1(l
a no.nc.a·pna1:~rsf.:C,~ree feiony under the
10
THE pEF~Nb!W(: cfp.
U.·Jaws of.the s..~te. o(O.tah. because :a notice of intent to seek
11
. ... . 'UIE courm The pre$umptic~Q i:r15 tq tif~. but, It
1.2· the death penaityhas nofyetbeenfifed. The minimum·
12 could be highe_r; couid be.towet..
.
13 penal~ that applfes· to: this offense ·isJiil indetenninate
13
r understand that ttiEfState has :agreedlo recommend
14 prison term of not ress ·than 25 years artd which may be for
14 a senteli® ~f 25 yea~ to nre:in 'excha.nge tor your guilty
1.s·· !if~::pij~ ffi.e· rn~im~m penaltyfs liftf'itl prlsoriWithout
15
t<>#99fcl~~.t~ rri_urder.
agrees to"recommen~ that
16: pa~r~~
.
.
.. . ...
.
16 tne· senteii~ oi'i the ~ggtava.ted .kidnapping charge should run
1J
D~ YOl$ und~rstan~. {hartti,e;$ are' t~~ P9$~iijle
17 current with _your ~enten~ f9r aggraya.ted murder.
1~ · penijlije$ th9t ~U?~h ·t<>'toe offense Qf:agg~~ied rnu~er as
18
Finally, I understand l~at you agree· lhatif you
.
f8 ··cl)rr~nily ·i;h.arged agai(Jst you?
·
19 · _are sµbpo~naed Jo.t~tify in a proceeding ~ga.inst Martin B_ond
20
THE DEFEN.DANT: Yes, str. .
.·
,. 20 thatyo~woufd appear arid testify truthfully in that
•21
THE COURT: Count 2 of the Information ane~es.iha ;21 ~toceedin9.
·
. ·
..
22 you have:comrnitled the· offense of a~gravated lddn·apping: I'm 22
ls this your understanding· ofthe plea agreement?
23 info·rmed,:~ndWhen·we he hear the factual basis in a few· .
23
THE DEFENDANT:'· Yes/sir: 24. ~pm~n~,'.ihat that ~!ales Roger ~nd Pa~ela - I'm sorry. :24._ . . ·. .. W,EO◊URT: In addition to thQse penalties we've
25:'the cme:count address~s·both; isthc1t correct, Mr. Taylor?
25 disC.µ§~e<i/yo,u ro.~yalsobe_ordered to pay a fine o_f up to

i~cJ~~s~ed·:a$·

I

pte~

natscf

to

MARY

<1·3SJ, B68~itns
16i' SoiAtDOO.~Me@ir C:l'.ty~. UT f!472li
BETH C.QOK1. •:C!R, .RPR

9·

·1 :$101090 for each offense/a so ~rcent sutchargrf and a ~3
2·" courtsecun""•·tee
atsoma·
· · iestitutio_
.:·.· •...... ....•.,1. ·:•. ...1:·:_
.. - .... y·oroet"
.. ,. ,..Y:au..·to
·...~~:
... . rt'
3'. to the victfins of your crime;_dQ yo.u und~tand that?
4·
THE DEFENDANT: ·tes, $ir.
.
5 . . . THE COURT:, ·1 want' to go through the eiem~o~ c>f
6 .the offenses with you now. The elements· of 1he offense of
7 aggravated murder as has been· charged against you in the
•8 Information are as follows:: That 'first .on or ·aboi.lf
9 ~overnber 16th, 2009, in Utah County,-llta~. yotfcaused the
1O death of Kay Mortensen and, second. that you did_ so
11 intentionally or knowingly and, third.- the.homicide w~s
12 committed incident to an act, scheme, course of condµct or
13 criminal episode during which you committed or attempted to
14 commit aggravated robbery1 robbery. aggravated burglary or
15 · burglary, aggrav~ted kidnapping or kidnapping. Here I_ gues$
16 the applicable other offense would be aggravated kidnapping.
17
The homicide·... ifs also alleged that the homicide
18 .· may have been or was committed for pecuniary gain 19 pecuniary is just another word for monetary; that there·was
20 ·some sort offinancial motive for it- or that the h.omfcfde.
2'1 was. com_mitted ·in an especialiy hem~us,''atrocious~ cii.fel or
22 exceptionally_df;?prave~ mannef,,any of whic~.must be
23 d~onstrated by physical torture, serious·p~ysical abuse or
24 .serious bodily injµry to the victim before .death.
25
Do you understand that these are the· elements of

6 only admitting to 2 a'n~ 3 or-to the fncidenf,to attempt.to
7 commit aggravated kidnapping and pecuntary ·gafn? Is that
-·a what ttie State is doirig today? I thoiig~Ohe. .fact~al basis
·9 would support all three, and that's ill th.e.,etem~nts Ui~t. you
10 have, provided to met ~o I'm mentioning ~U,°~ree~
11
Just for the recont Mr~ Esprt.~.. whe~ you were
1i. referring to 2 and 3. you're referring.to how-'~ey're
13• numbered on the statement of events·and·not how they're
14 numbered by statute:
·
15
MR.·E~~UN: .No, the statu~·vn~_~dibte).
ts
MR. TAYLOR; Our argurnen(is that itJ not
17 necessarily with regal'.(fs to subs 2t 3 and 4 that he'$
18 admitting all of those because those.are in 4.
19
THE COURT: Right, and I understand:20
M~-: TAYLOR:·: s~ it would just ~e showing that he
21 did It ·itj ~njunction with Mark Bond hthis way or in th.is.
2~ otherway,_and so that_would be- ~at's o~r argumenl so:
23: we1re not saying he necessarily dfd it, but that would be
24 part of what we're ·proving so that he s not admitting th'e
25 efemenls with regards (inaudible) 4.
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1
2

MR. ESPLIN: Ifs there.
THE.COURT: And it's an aftemate there?

MR,-,TAYLOR:. Yes; YQOrH~Mt
tHe couRT:· .As rafas iheadmrsston 01 the
,5 agreemeQt.then °tQday~_are\l!e· ~-reelng tiia.t tl)e.:defend~nt is
3

4_

1

1 the Qffense of aggravated rn1:1rder as it h£ts been charged .
1
THE .C()URTf .. I understand if you went to trial you'd
2 again~·yQ~? .
. . .
..
2 wanU<? have an th~ th_eories··go to a jury, but this is an
3 . .. . .MR! ESPLiN: Your J·fonor, wewould indicate that 3 agreement, and_ so I anticipal$ff - and I guess I s_houfd ~ave
4 Mr; .Rettig would be charged µn~~r-the intentionally ·aiding
·4 confirmed tllat eartier - but I anticipated that there was an_
5 another person to commit homicide. His· involvement is as _an . 5 agreement to {!lose three aggravating factors.even though they
·.5 accessory here) ·and he Uildetstands that as an accessory he is 6 are 11or" under the statute. You only need one of1hem.
7 liable as ifh_e were (in~tidible)..
7
MR ESPLIN: ffs prob~ry,~¢adernic:~xceptit
·a,
THE COURT:, fdidn1t see a reference -to 76-2--202 or .8 concerns us .about the sentencing ~itµ~~QO alth~ugh
·g· the party liability statute iffil.je_statemer(· . ·... ·. -. .. . .... -~ (inaudible) sent~nce·(inaudible):a{fec(Qn~udi~fe)~
10 •· .
MR. ESPLIN: Th~t's come- that's in the· facb,lal
10 .
THE COURT~ It may. twanUo r.nake ~~re w~ have an
11 statement. He was n9t the actual one that killed. Also, I
H agreemenfas to the erement'even thoughJhe statute.is "or."
12 don't kriow that Section 4 Qnaudibfe} for the death penalty
12 By nowWe.ought to have an agreement to the elements that
t3 or'capital homicide, but I think the State is really going
13 we'(e. pl~a.dm.g· fo~. Defyou. rieed. rnore.·Mme.?
14 uriderthe No. 2 and No. 3 there.
·•· .. . .
14. . •. ·. M~ftAn.Qrt. Judg$,lthin~~:at.-V.,hat.we'll~o.is
f5
MR. TAYLOR: If it were toJjo to trial, We wouid
15 that we'd be °fine with regards ·to tl)e
tf Mf. ~eft.ig
16. try to u~~ any one· .of.lho$e ·categorie$, but. I think .
.
16 ad.mils to subp~~graph fand'$ whrch ·sho~ th~ e.J.ements17 Mr. Esplin is rigot that thafs kind of Qna·udi~{e)~ _fihink
17 (ina_udible)•. _. . . . . ... .
.··
18 our factual basis~ you koow, ·mosUy a~heres to 2 and ~·- ifl
1ti'
]JiE CPURT:· Is th~t your ag~m(1fi¼.Mr. Esplin?
19 our statement of defendanfs plea under ihe element ofthe
1'9
. MR. ESPLIN: Yes, I think thafnufficient to
20 offense, we do include intentionally aiding another;person,
20 support the pfea:
21 so either he did it or he Intentionally aided anotlier person_.
21 ·
THE COURT: Any_ of the three are sufficient to
22 and so we did include Jhat in our statem~11l
22 sµpJ)Qtt:~~ pie~. You ·have 'the e>.rigfnar document in front of
23
THE COURT; In th~ facts~ .
23 you, Mr. ~~plinfis tMt lig~t?
.
24
MR TAYLOR: If you look 9fl page 2.
.24:
. MR. .ESPLIN·: Thet@'goil.lgto, ~,~ ~o l\meri~ed
25.·.
THE cou·RT: Under NQ;·11 ·
2s :into.nnaijon.
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THE COURT: ·1 mean the·statement of events.
MR. ESPLIN: Ye$~ l cfo/(oQi"Hooor:
1r1e•¢guRt~·: lfyo~
-m~ke ·a notation ·there-

~~~~

~-- then.
5

Mfl. ESPLJN:

filiju~tstnl<e 4.then. . .

.

6 . .
ii-ie· COURT;;: And ~y~u ~uld intti~IJhat ~ndh~ve
7 ·Mr. Rettig initial thatand·anow Mr/Taylor to inftialthat.
8
I'm riotsu~. M~. Taylor, if this level of minutiae
_9 .-9rde~ilfwasdi~~Usseij\Yltht1i.~vicfim's famify.
10. ...
lA~ rAY.i-9~;' _l(w.a~, ii.Qt Judge. We talked ~ore
11 .geoerally with regams ic;, the efem~nts. not particul~rfy with
12 · regards to go1ng· .through eve~. statutory [Inaudible) as to
13 -·what theory we would proceed.
..
14
THE.COURT: Whicit enhancements would bErnsed.
15 Want to. mwce sure _s1nce Jhars at least for me .a changeJn
1~ what l~~;:~~ri.in'~~ ·doc.urn.e~'ts here· that there's still. no ..
17 desi~,. on _th_e p~rt of the victims to make a statement today
18 · regarding th~ prea agreement.
19
···(Pause in proceedings.)
2~
MR..TAYLOR: Just for the record I spoke with Dada
21 M~rt~~~en and eXplained to her the amendment taking place on
~: 1J'.lafand w_~•.r~ ready to ·g9 forwar~ and proceed.
. ..
~~ . . .
THE COURT: If I might just comment Iunderstand
24_ that in, some ways th[$ e_f~ent 1s a difficult one even under
25 · these facts to establish because I don't know what evidence

1 intentionally and knowmg~ Mt Mortensen's ·death incidentto
tnoselwo a· ·ravatin ·. factors; that those are tne:·erements of
3 ~gg~v~ie<l~ij?ct~r;~:·lt'hif~en :i:h~rg~ ~gai~sfyij_u?
4
THE tlEfENDANT;' Y~, sri:' . . . . ..
5
TI-IE··couRT: The elemerits:ofthe.offefl$~()f
6 ~99rava~l<f4n~ppiog as it has been_.Qharged:~gafilstyou·in
7 ttte·lnformation ania~~.llows: First that:on or about
a November"16,:2009( inUtah County~ Utah, during the course of
9 bommittfngtinfawful'detention·orkidnapping, you.did either,
10 ~cond, possess, us~'or tteat_ei1 to use adangeroU$ weapon as
11 defined.in U~h Code ·section. 76-1.-601 or, tJ:tir4, act with
.
12 _intent to facifttate the comm~ion, ~~ropted commission 9r
13 flight after commission·or attempted co_mmission of a felony.
H4 hinder or delay the discovery or reporting of a•teiony or, c.
15 _inflict .bodily injOI)' onor to terrorize a victim or another.
16 .
·S_afl1~ question there, Mr. Espl~n, Is there an
17 ijgreem.ent_as to which of tho$_e aggravating factors Qr all of
18 them .woQki:,apply?
,-: .· . _ . . . .... .. .
19
MR ESPLIN: l think theywould alrapply, Your
20 Honor.
· ·
21 ...·. ...... THS CQ~RJ: lf.sJ04r un~~tstanding then.
22 ~f~ ~e~~ _fhatyoirr&-~d~itting· to ail !flr~ of those
23 ~ggravating factors today;:is that right?
24
l11E DEFENDANT: Yes. sir.
25
THE. COURT: Do you understand those elements of
2

16

-14

,1· the State has regarding hoW tong Mr~ Mortensen lived; You
1 aggravated kidnapping as l'Ve explained that to you?
2 ~·eedJ9 also unde·rstahclthatfrs· probably the element with
2 ··
THE DEFENDANT:: ·1do.
3· .the mosteriioifonaJ impact and the most reJe'vance to· the
3
TH1:·¢0QRT; . Rijarciing the assisfarici!°'of your
4 ·victim's. family as:it rerates to ·suffering of so·m~one who w~s
·4 ~unst!f riow,Jm go{rig l9 ·as~ you first of all, ·rve asked
.5 dying. So l underst~nd the difficulties today. I also
5 Y<?U before, but you hav~_-had a·~an~·to discuss the entering
8 understand the legal issues that the· attorneys are involved
6 of your plea with your-attorneys today?·
7 ini and ifs acomplicated one; and if you need more time,
7
. THE DEFENDANT: I' have~
a I'~ h~ppy to ·give it, but yoµre ready to proceeq? .
·a
WE ~OYRt _Afl~_previo~sly to today,?
9·
. MR TAYLOR: We'ie ready to proceed. Ju~ge. Tfia. k$
THE
t>EFENDANT:
·,..• . .
.
. l have.
1.0 you.
.. . . , . . . . . .
.
. . .
1_()
. . THE C9URT: You·had an adequate opportunity to
f1 .
THE:co.URT: · Ail righ(thank you. Let m,e just go 11 · spend ti~E3 with them so they coutd answer all of your
12dh(ough lh~tone.more.lime·.with you.
·
.· .
1i questions? . . . _ . . _.,
13·
Mt. Rettig, as far as the·courtistoncemed then,
13
THE'bei=ENDAAT:- Yes, sir.
'14 the reason· this itfan-aggravated murder is because the
14
THE COURT: Have your attomeys answered all of
1s homicide \va~- comm.ltted "incident t<>" one act, scheme; course of 15 your' questions?·
·
16 conductofciiminal·eplsode"dunng which you committed or
16 .
THE DEFENDANT: Yes,:sir~
1t ~tt~pt~d. tcfcommif aggravated ~idnapping, ~nd :the homicide 17 .... THE_ CO~R!: fw you fully satisfied With the
l~ ·was·committe~ (Qr pecuniary gain~ ·so instead <>f being "c,r' 1~ counsel ~nd· representation and advice that they\le given to
19-' there~we'tJroonsidering that you1re adrrittHng tQ both of
19= ypuJn·this C8$e?
20 thos~ aggravating factQrs; is that your understanding as.
20
nte·oEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
.
21 \Yell?
21
THE.:COURT: My understanding is thafthe attorneys
22
THE ~EFENDANT! Yesl sir.
22 have. been Stephen Frazier, Ann Boyle and Mike Esplin?
23 .·. . . THE.:C_OU.RT::· Doyou understand thattheseelemen ~3
· rHED,J;f,~NDANT: Y~sir.
24-: ~l~~'Vtfgqi,i~Jh_toµgh}hem t~is morning with the bfe~k.th~t 24
.T~E:~0.U.RT: DqyQU need any ad~iUonal tjm~ t~
~5•, ~ifha.ppel\e~ C>t'~bout November 16,.2009i-t~at you .caused 2~ confetwi~ theijl?
,;.,.

·.•

'

o~
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THE DEFENDANT: No. sir. .

TH~ COURT:: :Now~-•~arding.the.prea statement;
~ °)'Qtl've had a c,t~hce to.'read thafplea document there in front
4 of yqu? ·
·
·
5
THE DEFENDANT: i have~
6.
THECOl)RT:: .V<>.µ'v.e. read·tt:~ntirely pa~grap~ by
7 para9raph? ... ._ .· · , . =• •. , .. .,
8
. THE DEFENDANT: Ye$. sir.
-9
THE COURT: Did you have anyone read it to you, o
10 did you read it yourself? .
.
1j
MR! E$P_llN: ~oth~ H~ ~d.it himself. WeJe.~ a
12 copy~ andh~i$had a ~pyfor_~evera·lw~eks. . .
13
THE DEFEN.DANT: I've read lt multiple times. . .
14
MR-ESPLIN: We've also discussed It in•detailwith
15 him (in,audibl~k
1~.
TH.I; C.Qt)RT:. You've reviewed that document yours
17 men when you've had it over_ the last e9upl~ of weeks ~
18•.: elements Qf ~ggravated n,urqer and th~ elemen~ of aggravated
19 kidnapping as ,ve've discussed them today?
20
THE DEFENDANT: I have.:
21
THE COURT:: You've also had ·a chance to revlew fo
22· those lapl couple of weeks the possible: penalties lhat would
23 attach?
·
24
THE DEFENDANT: Yest sir..
25
THE:CQURT: Have.you been made aware Qf the

1 with J11nrancf(inaudible)fovestigation prior to having piea.
i·2 discussions. ·
·
·
3

THE COURT:

so.you've uncovered addfHonafevidence

4 that he~sbeen able<to'fevie_w?·

··yes.

. . . ...

5 ..., . ·., ~_ijJ$PµN_;:
6
THE C0~8T: _.All right Qe>yqu b~~Je~. Mr~ Esp.Ii~.
·
that there•s _a factuai basis for the$8:lW.o. pt.eas.?
8
MR. ESPLiN: I do..
.
9
THE COURT: •And do you believe, Mr. Esplin;that
.10 your clie.nt liriderstan~,:th~ 90n~nts Qf th~ pfea agreement
1 arid the consequen~ of.his pie~~ today $Swell as the
12 constitutional rights thafwould be w~ived?
·
13
MR.. ESPLIN; ·ves.
.,.·
. _
14
THE COURT: Mr. Rettig, i'm still going to."go over
15 with you justonelasttime~ This will b.e.th~ la~ttime that
tt6 you will ~av~ those rights ~xplained t~ you. '(p~~ read
17 them. You've had your attorneys explain tpe~ to you, ~nd ~ow
18, this will be the. last a.n~ that will occ;µr b.efc)reyou,r ple~,is
19 entered. Please listen carefully _lo .what f tetf yQtJ and:t~: .
20 my questioosa.nd be sure tQ let me know iftll~re'sanything
21 that you do not understand.. If you need to talk to your
2.2 attorney again, yo!) may ~o so in ·private or~ete ·at u:ie

t

t

23 podium.

24.

YQu have the. right to plead not guilty in thi$ case
25 and to have the case tried through a speedy and public.b'fal

18

1 eviden·ce the .state;wotild present againsryou in this case·if.
1 before an impartialjury arid an unbiased juiy; do you
.2 ft vje~t tq ·tn~I?. •..
. ·•
. ..
:2 iinders~nd this :~ght?
3
tHE,p~f.1:NDA'~J: ~.have!
..
.. . ....· 3. _· .. ·. ··- MFti.ESP.llff ·onern~~er~ W~;h.afa pr,efimi~.afy
.4
THE COlJRT;;. ·Based ~po~ Ute evid~~ theSta.~.W- utl hearing. explained it to the defendant, and he has not Wpived
;:5 fntrodu~ ~ttr.ial, 4o.. y~u bellev~ tha·~ th~~•s a substanti~i ·
·5 that as yet. .We have explained that there's: a preHminary
~ chance that if the jury Qe"!ieved the State's evidence you
·6 hearing set in this matter an.d that ~e has a right to
.
7 would be found guiltrofboth aggravated murder and
-7 preliminary hearing, and he needs to waive lhafbefore the
8 aggravated kidnappin_g?
8 Court
~
THE DEi=ENDANT; Yes, sit.:· ·. . .· . . ..· ·... ·9 . . . . THE.COURT:: Wetrartdotpatnrst: Mr. Rettig,you
TifE COµRT: H~~fyop(~Uomey~
yo Jff do have the
foipreliminary hearing ~s W~rt. One I$ .
-~.1 the rights whi~h ar~ s~tfort~.in iheple~·s~tement ·those.
11 ~urrently.setfor July ill which the_Gourtwould m.ake an ..
12 cooslltutional rights to a trial? . . .
12. independent detennination based on the evidence proyjde_d by
13
THE DEFENDANT: They'have..
13. the State ·as to whether or not there is probable cause)o
14.:
THE· COURT: Do you need anymore time to talk'to 14 warrant your continued prosecution on this case; ln other
15 them about those rights? . ·
.. ··
1s· words·. whether ofn·ot there's'probabre cause to warrant
16
THE O.EFENPANT.: N~. sir. .
...
·1a· ,contiri~lng t~ward~·trial. Jf.you warve t~at rt,gh~ thenw~.
17 . .
THE COURT~ ·1•11 ask you agai~~ l'm,sure yofh~v~. 17_ will fi~d that there ls piobable·cau~e, ~hiqh W.ifl bfa.v~if
1~--- Mr.'Espli_n, t,µt hav~:you _reviewed the evi~ence in this case.
18 shortfinding l;leca~se we \Yill soon. here~fter fin,d.tfi~t
19: with Mr. RetUgt _ . ·.. __ .
. . . 19 there1s· beyond ~, reasonable dou~i or that yoµ ~ave admitted
20
MR.-ESPtiN:.: Yes,-.on several occ.asions. Y~mr Hono 20 these.offenses, but you'd also waiveyour..righ(to a
.-; 21 we have discussed the.evidence arid the implication of the
·21 detennination of probable cause by.this ·court Js .it your
~~· ~vide~.a,3.:
. . .
.
.
22 desire tcfwaive th~f rightt9'prelimiriafyhearin9 in this
2~· _ : .· T~E:c.9y~Tt ,:~~-~~'$ ~are Qfyotit:a.l l~a~t
23; case?
· · •. · ·
· ·
i4.· interpreJ~µon of .mat ev,~~o:~?. . ..
24.
. THE/DEF.ENOANT:: Ye.s. $ir~
25
. . MR~ ~.$P.LtN:: .W~'y~ also had our investigator meet 2s·
THE.~90..RT~ ·. .M~: ~~-: ~~s~n.~~ril$:l9 th~fWaivef/

,q·
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MR. TAYLOR: Yes, sir,.we do.
.MR. NiELSEN: Just priotto the Court's going over·
this is w~~oticed omHbing on. Ql~etern.ents of aggravated
~idnappftjg~ The .firsfqne th~ftfieiCoµrt would ·nottfln th~
course Qf committing unlawful detention "pr"Ridnapping'that
obyiously shourq indud_e the efemen\s of ~~napping ~s wen
since they were delineated in the statem~nt That's· under
7~:.301~ An actor commits kidnapping if the actor

1

pr~ui:nptton of innocence and-tbatyou would tia~ no

2 obligation to prove'your fnnocence·because· you:·are presumed
3
3 to- be filnocen¼ do:you un~etstand lh~f rlg~t1·4
4
.
lHE: DEf,E_NDANT: Yes, sir~ .
5
5
_ lli;. CQURT; .po you understand _t11at if atrial Were
6
6 ~~d IJl~ State would ~ave to prove ~ach of the elements of
7
7 ·the offenses: ofaggravated murder and aggravated kidnapping
8
8 beyond a reaso·nable-doubt before yot:r courd be found guilty of
9 intentionally or knowingly~ without authority of law~ and
9 these offenses?
..
10·
will of the victim·: {a) detains orresirains the
10.
. , . 1HE-.Dl:R:.NDANT:· Yesi ~ir~
11. vfctfrnJor any substantial period of time: {b) detains or .
1'1
.. iH_e: CQYRT:' If.a trial were held before ajury, the
1-~ restrams ~e viclim in circumsta~ces .~xposi~g the victlm·to
12 ~relict WO\Jif~ave to_ be unanimous~ meaning that each juror
t3 risk of-b~ily injury. We befieve those would be the ones·
13 would have to find you gtiil{y"beyond a reasonable doubt
14 that apply in this case.
14 before·Y.t>u coufd be.convicted; do you understand this?
15
. MR. ESPLIN:• We:haVe"discussedthoseetementsw, 5
THE DEFENDANT: I do.
16· (Ile defendan{a~part of oµr QnaudiblE!).
:1 s
THE COli8T: Do you. understand tf1at by' pleading
17 .
.tHg COURT: .Mr." ReUig, did you hear that
17 guifly.y9u give up tlJe pr~tnnption of innocence, and you will
1a- detm,eation ofthe elef'l'.le_nts of kidnapping?
1~ ~ aqmitti~g to~ prlm~s of aggravat~d murder and
19
:TH~-DEFENDANT: Yes~ sir.
._ . . .
1~ aggravatedl9d~c1pping? .
20
THE COURT: And you understand the elements wo rl0 .
THE DEFENDANT: Yes;-Sif.
21 n~lo be proven against you on that count?
21
THE COURT: You have·an· absolute right tcHeniain
22 .
THE DEFENDANT: Yes~ sir.
22 ~Hent an..d yo4 can·oot b~ compel!~ irtcrim.i~a_te you~elf
23
THE COURT: _Thank you~· Mr. Nielsen.
2~ or to- provlde evi~~ri-~ agai_~st y9ij~eJf. Ari" iiicriininating .
24.· . . . Back to y~ur right to a $peedy and pu~lic jury
24 ~tatement_ fs ~ sta~rnent:wijich Y/O\lkl ten~ to ·connect you with
-25· trial before an impartial and unbiased jury, do you
25 the commission of the.crfmes. Do you understand that you

•sain~tthe

to

24

22

.1 understand thatnght?.
1 have an absolute rlghtto:remain· sileniand that you cannot
:2
THEDEFENDANT: I.do.
2 btrmadeto iliciimiriateyoi.Jtselri
.
;3
THE;COURT::: Although yo~ have ~e ijgh{to b~ bi . 3
THE DEFENDANT:. I d.o•:
4 by- ajury, Y9U foayaiso :have a·judge·declde·your:castfin.stead, 4
i'Hf::COURTZ In addition~ ify~u choose to remain
5 of a jury iflhe prosecution and tl)ejudge agree to that. If·
5 sile~~ youf silence cannot be used against you at trial. and
6 ajudge .were to decide your caseJ ·the judge would also have
6 theJurors Will be told that they 'COUid not hofd your
7 to· be an impartial and unbiased court or judge:· do you
7 decision not to· testify against you; do you ·understand this?
8 understand that right as well?
8
THE DEFENDANT: Yes; sir.
9
THE DEFENDANT: I
9
TffE COURT: Do you ·understand that a plea of guilty
10
tHE COURT: ·vou understand thatffyou have atria 10 is an admission of all the facts which would be necessary to
11 _yQu h~YQ a right to be represented by an attorney throughout 11 estabfish your guilt at· biai? _
12 those· proceedings,:a·nd if you cannot afford one, on~ would be 12
THE DEFENDANT: Nes,$i(,
13 appoititecno represent you. Votive been appointed the
13
THE COURT: Because-a ptea of guilty admits all
14 assistance of Mt; Espfin, Ms. Boyle and Mr. Frazier, ah'd they 14 facts necessary to establish guilt itis an incriminating
15: ciinfinue to be:your attonteys through fciday; is that correct?
15 statement •Do you understand thatby entering a· plea of
16
. . THE DEFENDANT: Yes,_sir. _ .. _ .__
16 gu1ItyJoii91ve·upyourrightto remain·snent?- .
fl
THE.COURT: lfyoudo not plead guilty.you ate
17 .
THe··oEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
18" presumed to be innocent until the State prQves that you are
1
THE COURT; Although you h~ve a righ(to remain
19 guUty aggravated murd~r and aggravated kidnapping. If
19 :¢1letjt. ifyQu wer~ to have a trial yQµ wo.u.fd h.ave a tight to
~o. yottchoo~e to fight or contest th~~1a ~tiarges_ against you, you ·_20 ·1e$tify in your own behalf if you wished to·do so; do you
21 rieetl"only plead not guilty and your case wm go to trial;
21. understand that right? .
22· you understand that?
22
THE DEFEN_DANT: Yes, sir._:
23·.
THE.DEFENDANT: l do~
23
THE COURT: Ifyou were·to have a trial, you would
24.
_ ·THE COURT: You. un~~rst~n.d Plat if atrial were
24, have·a righUo confront and ·cross-examine any witnesses
~5 held the S~tewould have the burd~n of overg>ming the
2$. whlcti·m"ay "ie~~ against you. This r.neans that your

do.
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·1 attorneys would be; able to. ask each witness questions while
2 the wilne$s js in open court and in your pr8$e.n.~·an~ utid~f
.3 o~th. Do you underst~nd th~t you ~~e this iig.hfl . . .
4
THE ~EFEND~T: Y~s, sir.
.
:5
THE COURT.; You also ,have a rightto pr~s~t
.6 evktence·and. to ~n,pel witnesses t() appear i.n.courtlQ
.7 testify for you; This means that you would be entitled to
8 obtain subpoenas requiring the atteMance and testimony.of
Q those witnesses, and that if you could notaf.forct:t~
10: the witnesses to appear the Stat~ woiM pay ijlgse
'.fot .
~ 1 you. Do you. understand that you hav~. this righ,t? ·
12 .
·THE DEFENDANT: Yes, s'ir..
13
THE COURT: If ajudge era jury were to find you
14 gui!ty, you would have: aright 10 appeal youfconViction to ·
15 the Utah Supreme Court. ln addition, youwoufd
the
:16 right tp have an attorney assist you in that app_eal~ If you
1:7 could not. afford the cost of the appe_af the, State. woufd theg
;1a pay tbose costs for.you. However, when you e,ntera pf~ of
19 guilty, you admit your own guilt. Having admitte~ yourguilt20 in this court, you cannot. CC?ntest your own ,tatement of guilt
21 on appeal; do you ~nders~nd (ni~?
22
THE.OEFENOANI: Yes. sir~2~ . . Tl:{1; COURT: Fin~!iy, doyou und_erstandtn.atby
2,4:. ·entering a plea of guilty .yo." giy~. up :all .ofthe rights whi~
25 we have just discussed as well as the rights set forth in the

P~Y:for

co~ts

have

1

1

THE COURT: Are you on probation at parole at this

2 Qr.n.e?
.3
4

TH~ P~~NOANT~- ·.N,o.Jm 110,l _ .... _ ....
THE.-POlJ_RT: .And-th~ ~e w~s.notco,nrt1itted while

$ you were on probation or parole?_ . . .
.
6
TH.E DEFENDANT:; (No audible respo.ns~.)
7
THE COURT: I will now go over briefly with you the
8 right to request a Withdrawal of your guilty pl~~s..
~ ·o_rdina~ly ia~r a person plea~~ g~ilty ~ut lat,(~~si~$ to·
1.Q withdraw his guilty pfea._ he mus( file .a. \\fiitt~~- tjlotion to
1 withdraw the pl~a before sentence is.~nQunced. A guilty
12 plea may only be withdravm with_permlss,o0.from. the Co~rt ~nd
13 only then by a showing that the plea:was not:knowingly and
·14 voluntarily made, In other wo'rds~:such a motion'may'be
15 denied~ Do you unQerstand this?·
16
THE DEFENDANT:· Yest sit
17
.
THE CdtJRT; ·vp·to
polo~ Mr. Rettij, is there
18 anything that you do. nc,t understand ~bQut 'this p~ding or
19 about the pleas that you will be entering 'in this case?
·
20
Tt,fE DEFENOAN"f;. No,. sir.
21
~E COURT; 1$ there·a~ythirigffu~t,yo~ W.OUkJ Jike
~2 to ask me or your attorneys before I accept your pl~a 'to
23 aggravated murd~r?
24
THE DEFENDANT:- ,No, $it
25
THE COURT: I'm· going to ask-the prosecutor to tell

t

thi~

28

26

1 plea statement?.
THE DEFENDANT: Yet sitTHE COURT: rn •riow discuss puefly ,with you tt,te
4 consequences of entering a guil(y p1$a. D_o
5 that by p_leading gu_ilty to agg~vated. _mur.cfer and .aggravated
6 kidnapping you will be_subjectin.g_youl'.5elf to serving
7 mandato,y penalties for these crimes?
8
THE DEFENDANT; I do.
:9, .
Tij_E:COU~T:· Your sen~ence ~iJI i~9tti~t) a_priso~.
1O. terin and· may_ also 1nclucfe a fine;. do you understand thl~?
11
THE DEFENDANT:_ Yes, sir..:
12
. THE COURT: ln .addition to :the fine, a 90 percent13: surcharge may be or will be imposed, and yoo may also be
14 ordered to make restitution for your crlme;.do you understand
15. that?
·
16 .'. ,..,
THEDEFENDANT:
Yes~
siri:. . ··. ·..
.·
...·,.-... ,.·::
17 .•
THI; COURT: Bt;!caus~ you1lf bf) pl~M,~gJq_ tw~
18_ offens.~, the.._$ent~nces tbatwill beimposed.f~r~a~h.cri,n,e
}9 may run concurrenlly ,or consecutiveiy, that is, one after the
20 other. and concurrently is at the same tirne
21 simultaneously.. It is within the Court's discretion to
22 decide,. Whether ifs a concurrent-.orconsecutiVe sentence
23 regardJess pf any piea agreementthafyou h~ve-enter~ into
24 with the ~ta~; do_ you \JOq~rstari~ this?
. .
2~:
. THE ·01:FENDANT: Yes, sir•.
·2
3·

you.~n~erstan~

:·.•

:'" . , . ;

or

MM¥
liii

BETI;( C'O()K.,

1 you and me what happened in this case•. I understand that
2 tttat is $[ready (f~umented on'the statement in frontofyou,

-3 a.nd y~tNe .had, .a: chan~to rev~w tb~t ~:d ~d Jii~t buJ
4
5
6
7
8

i.ill ask .him t.o: ~tate·:that .for the ~urt' r.eqo_rct ·1 warit yo~ .
to llste.n ~refuhy' be~_use;1Nhen ',the pr,os~~or Js thrQµgh

rm going fo as~ you if eveiyth1ngJhathe said is .true. If ·
there's anythlng·the prosecutor says that you believe Is not
.tru~l or accuratei-1 will,want you to. tell m~ ·about that,
9 okay? ··
· ·· ·
,··
·
THEQEfENDA~J::, Qlcay~

.-10

-:1J

THE COURT: Mr~_Taylor~
.
MR. TAYLOR: Judge, on:.or about November 1ath,

12
13
-14
·1§
16
17·
1s·
1~:·
20

2009, Martin Bond and Benjamin Rettig traveled in Bond's
vehicle from Vernal, Utah, to Kay Mortensen's homeJn Spanish
.Fo«-Utah.· The purpose in ~veling·to'Mortensen's home was
to. stE)ai fire~nns loca~d in Mortens~-n's home. UP9il .arriving
at l\tlortensen's home, Bond in~icate~. ~.e)v~~Jlp J~iq~tiy ~ie[
the home and then Rettig was to foJ_klw.him a·nd also enter ll)e
home. . _ .. , .. _ _ _. . ..
. ..· .
. ..
B.on.d. and R~ttig eQter~d. the.home.without being

2223
24.
25.

Mortensen. and both of them were· wearing ski·masks· and.latex
gloves in order tg bidt3 their Identities. They. commanded
M9rtenseri to :show trern where his fire~nni~JV~r~Jo_~~~
Mortensen toqk them to a.bunker fo~ted ~eh.in~:~1s h9~e. ~nd

21 .invited ancHiad.a handgunwith them.. ·e9.nd piaoecfzip'ti~~ p_n

cit .RP~

( ~35:), 8.6s..:.101.5

$orAID~tiOOM~:~ ,¢i;ey,.

QT .8472().

·1 they observed several weapo.ns~.
-2 . tiurikerand·Jiacldntohis home.

The.y took Mortensen from the

1 said a.Jrue·and a~rjlte ciescrtp~on ~f wllat occu~ irfthis 2 ~se'l
·· · · · · · · ·
3
tHE D.EFENDANT; Yes, sir.
4
_ lliE _tj:)tJrfy;· ·vou. have atra.a~y ~igned· lh~t dqcur.neri~

3 •: ·.. . ,. )Jt~i,~ntarijjg ~e,hop,~, _ihey:to9~ M,orl_ens~iJ .. .
:4 ~pstairs tq_fJ<baltlr®.m~J~pndJold Mortensen to.kneel ~own Jn
':5 ·front of th~. bathtu.b W{~h hfs 6a~ toJhern. While M9rtensen . 5

the statement ofevents?
.
6 wasJmeefingdown,Rettigwas holding Mortensen~tgunpoint. 6
MR: ·ESPLIN:: ·Hehas,VourHonor. For the record
7 · with Bond's handgun. Band withdrevi a knife from his person . 7 let me ask!· is that your sigt1ature?
8 andpl~ce~ thEfknifffbacJ< into hispQ~et ·At this point
8
THE.DEFENDANT:.: Yes, sir.
9 BOnd left the. bathfoom~: went downstairs and returned with a
9
M~ E~~Lltl;: :May_l appro~ch~ Yoµr Ho.~or.~
1Q bla~~~ild.ledknife ~ppfoximate1y· 10·1012 inches in length.
19
TtfE cp:µRT: 'Ye(~arikypu_~:· i hear'.choµrattorney
11
. ,Upqn returning, Rettig observed Bond ra.ke the knife
ask yop thi~~ :a~d' l h~ve a
in f{pnt Qf me.
12 and slice Mortensen's throat It is not certain how many
1~ pagej~ated June 1_st,,which]syes_terd~y,:201f..there•s a
13 times Bond cut Mortensen's throat After cutting hts throat
13 signature above the-inscription defendanfiooks like a Ben
14 · he observed Bond stabMortensen· ir{the base his neck with 14· Rettig. 1s th~t your sJgnature there?

'1f

of

15 thesiinieknlfe.. ·.....· ·....... , .
16 · .. Shorlly atter_Bqnd cut and ·stabbed Mortensen, lh~y ·
17 heard sorn.eo~e _kn~c~·o~ the front door. Rettig ran
.
18 downstairs, hid behind the front door and Bond openeifthe
19 ·door.•. A female and male were at the door asking for
2Q MQtt~sen~ _ThtW later discovered these individuals were
21 Pamela arid Roger Moriens~n. Rettig was still holding the gun
22 when Pamela. and Roger entered the home. They jnfo~~ Pa.

23 and Roger- that Mortensen was upstairs - e;xcuse me. Rettig
24. informed Pamela and Roger that Mortensen was upstairs and
25· that he was okay. They told Pam and Roger to walk into the

do~ument

On

15 . .
n,u~=oEFJ:~DANT: YesjiJ\
16
IBE C.Clt)BT: Mr.. Rettig, dcfyo_tif~I fha! iOs in
rt your best lnterestto.ent~r aguilty plea in this ~se on
18 these.two cot1nts rather than go to triai?

19
2()
21

THE DEFENDANT: ·1 do.
THE CQURT: -:yo.u ~ave previously' entered pleas of
-~ot gullty-iplea of guilty to ·the offe.~se of
ela ·aggravated murder and a pie~ of not guilty to ~e offen~e of
2~, agg~~cf kidnapping~ I'm. sorry, yoµ have nol What piea
24 d9 rou nQW enter to Count 1of the 'information c,uninai
25 homicide, aggravated mutder. a noncapital first-degree

not

32
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:1 .s'i.frikeri living ·room~.and they placed zip ties on Pamela ·and
1 felony?
2 Rogers hands a'.ricifeet . .
. .
2
THEQEFf:NDANT:- Guilty•.
3
. At some: pofn't' Bond came :oufo(ttie kitchen With
3
THE.'.CQlJRJ: go coi.i~t by: couril Ba~ed
4 ~noUler knffe which ·Rettig bel1ev~d he.was goirtgJ9_ u~ tci·
4 Mr. _Refi!g's ,answers Jo the questions posed to h_im. the Court
5 k.Ur Par.nera :~nfRoger•. Rettig stepped in front of Bond and
5 finds that he'_has Jead, signed. and f'ully understands the
6 iotd him notlo kill them~ While Pamefa·and ·Roger w~re tied
6 ~ntents of.the plea_-statemenl ·Based.upon the plea
-7 Ojiirt the living room·, Rettig remained in the living room
7 statement and the 'Court's discussions with and observations
:8 :with them holding the handgun while Bon~ ,removed
a of Mt: Rettig, the court finds that he has entered a pfea ·of
~-. ~ppr,o~ima~ely 25 o(Mprteil~~n~s ·weaponsl iocl~d'ing han~guns 9 g:uilt;d<>_:~ggfava't~d)nurdef_ kribw~ngly ~nd voluntarily and
10· and mtes,-from the bunk~r and placed them in Bond's
10 witnJulfknowtedge of his _rights. the Court aiso finds that
H ve~jcte. They also - Rettig a1$o helped tak~ some
11 Mr. Re~g und~tands the nature· _and elements of the offense
12 ammunition from the. bunker and pface it in Bond's vehicle.
1z: Qf aggravated m.urdetand ·tne·relationship between the facts
13
After the.y placed the guns and ammunition in Bondis :13 iil this case and the efemenis· of that offense.
14 vehicte, theytook Rqger Mortensen1s drivefs licen·se and
14
FiriaUy, the Court finds that the State's proffered
1s· told :him arid PamJhat' they needed to tell the police that15 evidence, ifbelfeved,'ls sufficient to· form afactual basis·
16:· thraeblacfcmeifhaa tied them up. and if they told the police
16 for M~~ Rettig'sj.>lea of SU.illy. Based upon the foregoing,
17° adiffe~n(story they knew where they lived, and they would 1·7 ~e Court accepts-the deferid~nfs pfea of guilty to
18 come back ·and kill them.
18 aggravated mutd~r.
1Q
· Tuey left .Mortens.en's residenceJ drove _back tp
1~Mr. Rettig, what piea do you ·now enter to· Cot1nt 2
20, Vernal. On the way back to Vernal, they stoppedat a rest. . 20_ Qf\he Information. ·aggravated kidnapping which relates.to
21 stop and discarded some gloves in a dumpster. In Vernal Bond 21' Roger and Parriera Mortensen, a first-degree felony?
22 andRettigwent up the canyon and buried the weapons.
22
THE:DEFENDANT;· Guilty.
23 Following _this~ Bon~ took the hoodie and shoes from Rettig in ~3
, . . THE CO_lJRT: Ba$ed upon Mr: Rettig's ansWer.s to the
i4 prefer to dispose ·of _them.
24 :q~stio~s· pos~tf f() hUTJ. the plea .s~t~rn~nt ~nd the Court's .
~5;
THE COURT: Mr~ Rettig, is what the prpseg~torJu~~ :2s: dJ~cussionswith and ob$ervations of Mr. Rettig, the Court .

rn

~ y BSTH ~OOK, :c~t aPif

·•

'(435). 8-68..;1075

i6i sotAIDOO~Me@ii.r ¢.Jty.;

ur sJ12o

on

33

-1 finds 1hathe fu1ly. under:stand~ the contents ofthe ptea

,

i ·statement ·and that he has entered his plea .of"guHty' to

·2

3

3

4.

.. . .
aggravated kidnapping knowingly and voluntarily and with tun ·
knowledge of his rig~ts! Jhe ~ourta1$<ffmdt1 ~at·
Mr. ijettig understands the nature ·and elements cif the.offeos.~
of aggravated kidnapping a~d..Ul~. ~lationship be~~rr ti'.¥ .

4
.5
_6
7
8
9
1o

5.
6
7 facts in this case 3Dd the efements of thai offense. ... .
·8
Finally,· the Court finds that ttie State•s pro~red
9 evidence, if believed,. is sufficient to form a factuar basts
10 ·for Mr..Rettig's ptea of guilty. ·Bas~ upon the _foregoing,
11 the Cowt ~c~p\s the defendant's plea of guilty to
12 aggrayated kidnappiog.
13 ..
Does the State have a motion-regarding Counts 3 an
14 4?
15
MR TAYLOR: State moves·to dismiss those counts,
1_8 . J.W9e.~
·· . . . .. . · ..

_1$.

on the moµon of the_.$fate. and anticipate the filing ofan
25 Amended ln(ormation in this case.

25

11
12
13
14

15

17 . .. . TH~COt)Ri: There's-no obj~ctiori I assume to that, 1!
18 fv1r.· E~pli11f .. . .
..
..
.. 1~
1~, . MR. ESP.Ut--l: Yes. 'we have agreed that the State 19
20 ·wul proVide an Amended Information.
.
20
21
.
MR TAYLOR: We'll file an Amended.Information
21
:22 ·Qn~u~ibfe}~
22,
23° · · · THE couRr:. The court will dismiss Counts 3and 4 23

.24

THE DEFENDANl} No. sir.
.
THE COURT:· rs::fhere anything· else tirau have
omitted or need to handle today; Mr. Esplin?
MR. ESPLIN: Nq1 You.rHonQt
THE COURT:· Anything .~ls~'.(..ne~ fo doJoday,
~~- Taylor?
MR. TAYLOR: No, Judg~.- thank y<:>ll.
.
THE COURT: rd ·IJke·to thank ·tt,re:attomeysfo.r
their hard work in this case. I know· this.is Just the ~P- of
the. iceberg ·what we'v~ see~ an~ d,otj$.. ~~rt! tog~y and·tttat inany
hqurs have been spe_nt previo~s to· this. ··res "a-"weJghiy ~se· . .
for all involved. If~ a weighty case f~the_yictims aod:a
weighty case for you as wen, Mr. 'Rettig. TJlank ·you,
Mr. Esplin and Mr. Frazier and, thank you, Mr•. Taylor and
Mr. Nielsen~ We'll be in recess.
·
(Whereupon, ih~ pro~edingifr.oricloded at
9:52 a.m.}

. . . . ....

. 24°
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Mr. ReUlg; pursuant to Ruie 22 of the Utah Rules·:
of Criminal .Procedure~ the Court must set a time for'
3 senten~i~g which can:nol .be less: thariMo days OQ(more than
4 45 days after. the entry of the pleas. ~nless the Court,· with . . .
1

2

5 your ~ncurrence; orders ·otherwis~.
6
What.is th:e party's reque$t?
7
MR. ESPLIN: We'd iequesfihe matter be set r
B believe it's on thtngth ·of Juty, Your Honor, which js
-.~. a~tually tw~ days,. rthmk, past the 45 days. :TIWdefendant
10 will waive the time (inaUdible) two days.
11
THE COURT:.- _Is that yotir desir~. Mr. Rettig, to
12 waive.your.rfghtto be senten~ in fess than 45d~ys?
13
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.,
..
14 ·
THE COURT: We'll setsentencing then in ·this case

15 ~ for July 19th at 2:30 p.mi

16 Mr•. Rettig, an a~e6t.fr~J11 MuJt pf9ba\i<>.n.and:
ft Parole will be contacting you the jail and lnt~~tewlng

at

18 .you and providing you wil~.paperwork to.fill qutregarding
19 your life ~nd ·your experiences and your criminal histQry ~nd
20 -other it~m$~· We'll Qrder thatyou (;()_operate with hll'n ir1
21 preparation of that presentence report. He'll arso be
22 -compiling information from the State 'arid from the defense. and
23 fron, tne_victims.in this-case to p(oVide -~-c<>inplete.sentence
2it ·~oJhe Court for senlen~ing on ~uly 19th~
25 ·
· Do ,you have any-quesUoJJs about th~t pr.,~,~?
MA~.f.-; ~~Tlf COQK,
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